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Abstract
This Article analyzes the history from 1994-1999 of the secondary market in emerging mar-
kets debt, identifying the lessons learned from that period of market development. It pays particu-
lar attention to the increasing integration of the secondary market for emerging markets debt with
traditional financial markets, and to the force for globalization that this secondary market therefore
exerted in the period.
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The secondary market in emerging markets debt is based in
New York and London and grew out of the loan swapping
among banks in 1983 in response to the debt crisis. The author
has previously chronicled the development of the market from
1983 to 1993,1 and analyzed several of its aspects.2 This Article
analyzes the market history from 1994-1999, identifying the les-
sons learned from that period of market development. It pays
particular attention to the increasing integration of the secon-
dary market for emerging markets debt with traditional financial
markets, and to the force for globalization that this secondary
market therefore exerted in the period.
I. THE MARKET'S DEVELOPMENT: YEAR BY YEAR
The year 1993 witnessed an extraordinary bull run in the
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1. See generally Ross P. Buckley, The Transformative Potential of a Secondary Market:
Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1983 to 1989, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1152 (1998)
[hereinafter Buckley, Transformative Potential]; Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the
Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1802
(1998) [hereinafter Buckley, Brady Plan].
2. See generally Ross P. Buckley, Reschedulings as the Groundwork for Secondary Markets
in Sovereign Debt, 26 DENVERJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 299 (1998); Ross P. Buckley, The Regula-
tion of the Emerging Markets Loan Market, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 47 (1998); Ross P.
Buckley, The Law of Emerging Markets Loan Sales, 14J. IN-r'L BANKING L. 110 (1999); Ross
P. Buckley, The Practice of Emerging Markets Loan Sales, 14J. INT'L BANKING L. 151 (1999).
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secondary market for emerging markets debt.3 The bull market
continued through the New Year into 1994 with the Salomon
Brady bond index jumping an extraordinary 15.75% in January
1994. 4 In that month there was a revolt in Chiapas, Mexico's
southernmost state, but the market's upward trend barely hesi-
tated, at the time, on this evidence of political instability. It was
the risk of inflation to Mexico's north, not ill-treated peasants in
its south that was to end the bull run.
A. 1994: The Bears Growl
Notwithstanding the strong performance in January, by
June 1994 the Salomon Brady bond index had fallen 33% for
the year5 and loan prices had fallen further, with Russian and
Peruvian loans down almost 50%.6 The magnitude of these
price falls owed much to their inflated values at the end of 1993.
The boom of 1993 had been fuelled in part by low interest rates
in the United States that saw fund managers and other investors
seeking higher returns in the emerging markets. The turn-
around in this interest rate environment was the major factor in
the market collapse of 1994. The other important factors were
the excesses of 1993, particularly excessive leverage, and the po-
litical risks displayed in Mexico and Venezuela. Each will be con-
sidered.
1. U.S. Interest Rate Rises
On February 4, 1994, in an effort to curb potential inflation-
ary pressures, the U.S. Federal Reserve increased short-term in-
3. See Buckley, Brady Plan, supra note 1, at 1867.
4. See Scott Weeks, Where Euphoria Ends, Maturity Begins in Latin Bond Market: Real-
ity Check, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 1994, at 26. Brady Bonds are US$ denominated bonds
issued by an emerging market and collateralized by U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds.
See Ross P. Buckley, Turning Loans into Bonds: Lessons for East Asia from the Latin American
Brady Plan, 1J. RESTRUCTURING FIN. 185 (2004) [hereinafter Buckley, Turning Loans into
Bonds].
5. See Weeks, supra note 4, at 26. Other indices deliver slightly different figures:
The LDCX, compiled by Finacor, which is an index of Brady bonds and value impaired
loans, recorded a 26.6% drop between the peak in mid-January and the trough in mid-
April, andJP Morgan's Emerging Markets Bond Index, which is a total return index (so
that it includes the high yields) of Brady bonds, recorded a drop for 1994 as a whole of
only 17.3%. See Melvyn Westlake, Annus Horribilis, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Jan.
1995, at 14 [hereinafter Westlake, Horribilis].
6. See Emerging-Market Debt-Crash Landing, ECONOMIST (U.K. ed.), Apr. 30, 1994, at
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terest rates. 7 The rates continued to climb throughout 1994.'
As interest rates rose, U.S. Treasury bond prices fell accordingly,
and emerging market bonds, which had for some time been
priced at margins above U.S. Treasuries,9 fell precipitately. In
1993, this movement was exacerbated by the narrowing of the
spread between emerging market and U.S. Treasury bonds:
While the yield on the U.S. long bond declined some 104 basis
points in 1993, the spread between it and emerging markets
bonds, on average, declined a dramatic 413 basis points. 10 As
U.S. rates moved upwards in 1994, and U.S. long term rates rose
126 basis points in the first half of the year,11 investors suddenly
found the price differential between emerging market and U.S.
instruments grossly inadequate to compensate for the increasing
risk on display south of the border.
2. The Excesses of the 1993 Bull Run
The bull run of 1993 was, by any measures, extraordinary.
The Salomon Brady bond index rose 44% during 1993, and a
further 15% in January 1994.12 The prices of many loans in-
creased even more dramatically. Peruvian loans, which had sold
for twenty cents on the U.S. dollar in early 1993, were trading
above seventy U.S. cents in early 1994."3 Peru was not servicing
its loans, so these prices were a gamble on a Brady-style restruc-
turing in which Peru would decide to meet its obligations. Rus-
sian loans were at equally unrealistic prices.1 4 However, recent
restructurings had proven notoriously slow to complete. Brazil's
7. See Secondary Markets-Hit by US Rates, INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 19, 1994; see also
Simon Hylson-Smith, Preview of 1995-Waiting for the Next Bull Market, INT'L FIN. REV.,
Review of the Year 1994, Dec. 17, 1994.
8. See Secondary Market-Hit Hard, INT'L FIN. REv., Nov. 5, 1994.
9. See Emerging-Market Debt-Crash Landing, supra note 6, at 113.
10. See Keith Mullin, IMP/World Bank Report-Latin America-New Issue Blues, INT'L
FIN. Rrv., Sept. 24, 1994 [hereinafter Mullin, New Issue Blues] (citing the JPMorgan
Emerging Markets Bond Index).
11. See id.
12. See Emerging-Market Debt-Crash Landing, supra note 6, at 113; see also Weeks,
supra note 4, at 26.
13. See Richard S. Teitelbaum, A First-Class Payoff from Third World Debt, FORTUNE,
Feb. 21, 1994, at 28; see also Keith Mullin, IMF/World Bank Report-LDC Markets-Majors
Hang Tough, Irr'L FIN. REV., Sept. 24, 1994 [hereinafter Mullin, Majors Hang Tough].
14. See Dangerous to Know?, ECONOMIST (U.K. ed.), Mar. 12, 1994, at 114.
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restructuring had required over a year longer than anyone antic-
ipated. Paying these prices for non-performing loans purely in
anticipation of a restructuring was unalloyed, high-risk specula-
tion.
Many market investors were also highly leveraged in 1993.15
As Bill Nightingale said:
The US stock and bond markets have regulatory limits on
how much systematic leverage there can be-the emerging
markets have none. It's purely between the investors and the
dealers to determine how much leverage they want to take.
There was a hell of a lot in this market, and probably much
more than . . .in any well-regulated market.'
6
Hedge funds and other risk-friendly institutional investors had
taken large positions in Brady bonds on margin. A number of
banks had leveraged their clients, both institutional and individ-
ual investors, by up to 900%." 7 These investors tended to look
upon Brady bonds as high liquidity instruments that could be
sold immediately upon a change in the interest rate environ-
ment. i8 However, in a falling market, buyers proved to be very
scarce indeed. The depth of panic in the market is evidenced by
the fact that the prices of floating-rate Brady bonds fell virtually
as far as fixed-rate Bradys, even though floating-rate bonds that
trade at deep discounts would normally rise in value in a rising
interest rate environment.' 9 Buyers were simply too rare to sup-
port the market.
In addition to the investors who were forced to sell to meet
margin calls, others who had purchased Brazil's when-and-if-is-
sued Brady bonds at high prices in late 1993 also had to sell as
market prices were substantially lower when completion of the
long-awaited restructuring neared.20 Counterparty defaults ad-
ded further to trader's losses in 1994. Many participants had
15. See Richard Voorhees, Volatile Mix (Latin American Credit Market), LATINFINANCE,
May 1994, at 26 ("[I1n the LDC secondary debt market, a lot more leveraging was being
done than hedging, and ... an across-the-board collapse .. .attests to that.").
16. See Weeks, supra note 4, at 26.
17. See Mullin, Majors Hang Tough, supra note 13.
18. See Weeks, supra note 4, at 26.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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joined the market in the bull run and had no experience of, and
inadequate capital to withstand, an emerging markets collapse.
The resulting defaults made trading even more expensive and
difficult for the remaining participants.2'
In summary, during the bull run of 1993, investors forgot
the historical volatility of emerging markets and their history of
defaulting on their debts. Brady bonds were liquid instruments,
traded in Euroclear and CEDEL, and it was all too easy to believe
that there would be buyers when one wanted, or needed, to
sell.2 2 However, many of the institutional investors which had
discovered emerging markets debt in the halcyon days of 1993
got out of the market more quickly than they had gotten into it,
and the primary source of demand which had buoyed the mar-
ket throughout 1993 was suddenly mostly gone.23
3. Political Risks
The Chiapas uprising in 1994 underlined the political un-
certainty of the region. Political risk in international finance
usually refers to the risks associated with the stability of govern-
ment and governmental decisions. In Mexico, political risk also
had a more literal meaning: 1994 was an election year, and in
March the ruling party's presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo
Colosio, was assassinated. 24
In Brazil, 1994 was also an election year, and early polls
showed a populist left-leaning candidate in the lead.25 The spec-
ter of a retreat from economic austerity and the threat of a re-
turn to hyperinflation shook the market. Furthermore, a radical
new economic plan and a new currency, the real, were intro-
duced in July.26
In Venezuela, the banking system went into crisis; and the
government responded with a bailout which cost some 10% of
21. See Mullin, Majors Hang Tough, supra note 13.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Mullin, New Issue Blues, supra note 10.
25. See Mullin, Majors Hang Tough, supra note 13.
26. See Mullin, New Issue Blues, supra note 10.
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GDP. Venezuela's economy was in dire straits and default on its
Brady bonds was a real and imminent prospect.
27
Finally, in September, to cap off a year which thrust political
risk before investors without respite, there was a second assassi-
nation in Mexico, of the Secretary General of the ruling party,
Francisco Ruiz Massieu.2 By early December, most emerging
markets debt traders were consoling themselves with the thought
that at least things could not be worse in the market in 1995.
They were wrong.
B. 1995: Mexico's Crisis and the Tequila Effect
As 1994 drew to a close, Mexico was spending its foreign
exchange reserves heavily to defend the value of the peso. These
reserves, US$30 billion in February, had declined to around
US$11 billion by December 1994.29 The overvalued national
currency could no longer be supported, and on December 19,
the new Mexican government let the peso float against the U.S.
dollar, resulting in a substantial devaluation.3 ° In addition, the
Mexican stock market fell over 40% in the first quarter of 1995,3"
and Mexican Brady bonds and Eurobonds fell so far that at one
stage U.S. dollar-denominated Eurobonds issued by prime Mexi-
can banks were yielding 2500 basis points over U.S. Treasury
bonds.12 The common refrain of traders in January 1995 was
that "it was almost a freefall .... I've never seen anything like
27. See Venezuela-Still in the Doldrums, INT'L FIN. REv., Aug. 6, 1994.
28. See Mark Fineman, Assassination: Ruiz Massieu Accuses Party Officials of Cover-Up
In Brother's Slaying. They Deny Charge, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at 3.
29. See Westlake, supra note 5, at 14.
30. See Bloomberg Business News, Mexico Floats Peso, Sees It Sink, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale), Dec. 23, 1994, at D1. Mexico's handling of its devaluation in late
1994 attracted criticism, particularly for its timing only one week before Christmas
when many investment houses were short-staffed and winding up positions for the year.
See Sean Kennedy, Emerging Markets Growing Stronger, S. CHINA MORNING Posr, Apr. 25,
1995, at 14; see also Keith Mullin, Tequila Hangover-A Year to Forget, IN'r'L FIN. REV., Dec.
16, 1995 (hereinafter Mullin, Tequila Hangover].
31. See Gordon Platt, Mexican Virus Fells Emerging Markets but Prognosis Good Among
Healthiest, J. CoM., May 4, 1995, at 2A.
32. See Catherine Evans & Keith Mullin, IMFIWorld Bank Report-Emerging Mar-
kets-Investors Step Back into the Arena, INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 30, 1995; see also Mullin,
Tequila Hangover, supra note 30.
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it."'3 3 This spoke to the general inexperience of the traders, as
the market had been through it all before, in October 1991." 4
However, that crash was a memory only of the few "veterans"
who had been in the market that long.
There are three major reasons the devaluation became nec-
essary: (i) the previous administration had long left the peso
overvalued to curb inflation;35 (ii) Mexico's short-term indebted-
ness had been growing so that it amounted to some 35% of its
total debt, and its refinancing was proving increasingly diffi-
cult,3 '6 as the many adverse factors at play in 1994 conspired to
direct foreign capital away from Mexico; and (iii) over the pre-
ceding three years Mexico had accumulated a balance of pay-
ments deficit of over US$90 billion, a deficit approaching that of
the rest of Latin America and Asia combined, and was financing
it by the sale of securities to U.S. investors, which throughout
1994 became increasingly difficult and expensive.3 7
Ironically, "commentators, economists and finance profes-
sionals had been calling out for a Mexican peso devaluation for
"138some time. A crisis was caused by a development that the ex-
perts had been recommending but the inevitability of which the
financial markets, replete from a year of profits, did not want to
acknowledge. Indeed, even as late as November 1994journalists
were writing, " [f] or Western investors the message is: buy ....
[T] he potential of most emerging markets [is] beyond doubt."3 9
The Mexican peso crisis happened one month later.
33. Emerging Market Debt-Tequila Slammers, INT'L FIN. REv.,Jan. 14, 1995 [hereinaf-
ter Tequila Slammers].
34. See Buckley, Brady Plan, supra note 1, at 1856-60.
35. See William C. Melton, The Fall of the Peso; Four Factors Contributed to the Grand
Collapse, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Mar. 13, 1995, at 3D.
36. See Brendan Murphy, Foreign Help Stemmed Financial Panic in Mexico. Can It Now
Heal a Suddenly Wounded Economy?, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Feb. 5, 1995, at G1.
37. See William Keegan, In My View: Pesos from Heaven Pose Problems on Earth, Oa-
SERVER, Feb. 5, 1995, at 2.
38. Mullin, Tequila Hangover, supra note 30; see also Anthony DePalma, Casualty of
the Peso: Investor Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1994, at DI; David E. Sanger & Anthony
DePalma, On Both Sides of the Border, Peso Ills Were Long Ignored, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 24, 1995,
at Al.
39. Paul Nuki, Jaguar Economies Leap Forward, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 27,
1994. To be fair to journalists, they do sometimes write articles of remarkable presci-
ence. See, e.g., James K. Glassman, The Emerging-Markets Frenzy Is Starting to Look Foolish,
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at D1 (published one week before the first collapse of
1994); see also Economists Caution Mexico to Increase Savings Rate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1994, at D8.
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The United States quickly assembled an international finan-
cial rescue package. Over US$50 billion of credit support was
provided for Mexico: US$20 billion from the United States
through its Exchange Stabilization Fund ("ESF"),4° and the bal-
ance from the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the Bank
for International Settlements, the Inter-American Development
Bank, the World Bank and Canada.4" This rescue package had a
dramatic effect on the secondary market. On the day President
Clinton announced the package Mexico's par bonds rose from
US44¢ to US55.5¢ and its discount bonds from US560 to
US72.5¢. The prices of debts of other emerging nations rose
likewise.42
Nonetheless, the flow-on effects of Mexico's troubles were
so severe that, even with time for reflection, financial journalists
were writing that "Mexico had almost single-handedly destroyed
the emerging markets as an investment class."43 How could one
country almost destroy an entire market by itself? The answer
was an effect named by someone who had overindulged in the
oily indigenous alcohol of Mexico and paid the price.
1. The Tequila Effect
Mexico's problems in late 1994 and early 1995 were trans-
mitted to other emerging markets with a speed and severity
40. See Melton, supra note 35, at 3D. On January 12, 1995 President Clinton re-
quested approval of the U.S. Congress for US$40 billion of loan guarantees to prevent
Mexico from defaulting on its debt. However, this proved to be politically controversial
in the United States, and, while Congress tried to decide, the President acted unilater-
ally by negotiating additional loans for Mexico from the IMF and the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements and by committing US$20 billion from the Exchange Stabilization
Fund of the U.S. Treasury to Mexico. This Fund in the U.S. Treasury was generally
used to stabilize the U.S. dollar in the currency markets-its use for such a purpose by a
President acting without explicit Congressional approval was legally questionable as well
as controversial. See generally Russell D. Covey, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: Separa-
tion of Powers and National Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE L.J. 1311
(1996). Nonetheless, most of the debt had been repaid by Mexico byJanuary 1997. See
generally David E. Sanger, Mexico Repays its Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997.
41. See Mullin, Tequila Hangover, supra note 30. The Bank for International Settle-
ments made some US$10 billion available which Mexico declined to use as it was availa-
ble only by way of short-term loans. See Emerging Market Debt-JDB Meeting: A Sentiment
Booster, INT'L FIN. REv., Apr. 8, 1995.
42. See Tequila Slammers, supra note 33.
43. Jennifer Tierney & Keith Mullin, Agency Borrower-Nacional Financeria-Kicking
the Tequila Habit, INT'L FIN. REv., Review of the Year 1995, Dec. 16, 1995.
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which few expected, and which was labelled the "tequila ef-
fect."4 4 The debt of almost all emerging markets, from Eastern
Europe to Asia, was in the first months of 1995 affected by the
Mexican devaluation and subsequent problems.4" Argentina was
the hardest hit, but the contagion spread through most of Latin
America and Eastern Europe and much of Asia.4 6
Argentina suffered from capital flight "of staggering propor-
tions" as "[m]uch of the flight capital that had returned to the
country flew out again. '4 7 In addition, "[s]hort-term capital,
much of it American, stampeded out on fears of a return to
hyper-inflation and a breakdown in .. . dollar convertibility. "48
This led to the collapse of a number of banks, and the govern-
ment was soon seeking an international rescue package which
when granted comprised some US$11.4 billion.49 In Thailand
the baht came under sustained pressure and required massive
support from the central bank to avoid a devaluation.5 ° Polish
Brady bonds fell 7.8%, and Bulgaria's over 10%," 1 the Philip-
pines stock market fell over 17%,52 Hong Kong's some 15%,"
and the stock markets of nations as diverse as China, Hungary,
India, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey all fell
over 10% in January as funds withdrew generally from emerging
markets.54 Most East Asian nations, in particular, worked hard
44. See Mullin, Tequila Hangover, supra note 30.
45. See id.; see also Mexican Crisis Triggers Wave of Selling in Asian Currencies, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 13, 1995, at 1.
46. See Inter-American Development Bank Report-Equity and Privatization-Proceed with
Caution, INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 16, 1996; see also Evans & Mullin, supra note 32.
47. Mullin, Tequila Hangover, supra note 30.
48. BillJamieson, South American Agenda: Latins Learning the New Discipline, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, Apr. 9, 1995, at 4.
49. Mullin, Tequila Hangover, supra note 30.
50. See Tequila Slammers, supra note 33.
51. See Stan Hinden, Global Investors Strike Up the Bond, WASH. PosT, Jan. 28, 1996, at
H3.
52. See Platt, supra note 31, at 2A.
53. Clifford German, Wary Investors Are Spoilt for Choice in Asia, INDEPENDENT, Feb.
25, 1995, at 20.
54. See Floyd Norris, Mexican Shadow Falls on Emerging Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1995, at DI; see also Vikram Khanna, The Ghost of Mexico Still Haunts Asian Markets, Bus.
TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 23, 1995, at 13.
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to distinguish their economies from Mexico's as their stock and
bond markets took a battering.
55
Yet, the economies of these countries shared little in com-
mon with Mexico. Argentina and Hungary were identified as
having large and growing current-account deficits but far less of
their deficits were financed by short-term capital-a crucial part
of the Mexican equation.56 In part, the tequila effect arose be-
cause many fund managers had invested heavily in Mexico and
less so in the other emerging markets but, needing cash to meet
margin calls and redemptions in Mexico, sold in the other mar-
kets.5 7 Mostly, however, in the words of fund manager, Isabel
Saltzman, "[i]t was the classic panic market. '5 8 The tequila ef-
fect "was a sobering reminder that big institutional investors
were looking at all 'emerging markets' from Santiago to Seoul
through a single lens."5
9
Recovery from the tequila effect took time.60 Latin sover-
eigns were issuing debt, admittedly at very high spreads, as early
as May 1995,61 and bond issuers were active in the markets in the
second half of 1995. However, Brady bonds traded at extraordi-
nary yields throughout most of 1995. For instance, the stripped
spreads (the spread after deduction of the collateral guarantees
over that of comparable U.S. Treasury bonds) for the Bradys of
the major Latin nations exceeded 1000 basis points for most of
1995 and, in October, still exceeded 1250 basis points for Argen-
55. See Philip Shenon, A Bad Week in the Asian Markets, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1995, at DI; see also Maggie Ford, Showing Everyone That Indonesia Is No Mexico, Bus.
TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 26, 1995, at 11; Mustafa Hassan, Mexico's Economic Debacle Reflects
Failure of US Policy, Bus. TIMES (Malay.), Jan. 17, 1995, at 6; Datuk Dr Noordin Sopiee,
We Are Not Going Down Mexico Way, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 14, 1995, at 15.
56. See Latin America in the Fallout Zone, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 59.
57. See id.
58. Hinden, supra note 51, at H3. To put the panic in context, in 1993 Mexico
had been admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") and the Mexican economy was considered so stable and prosperous that it
was widely expected that Mexican debt would shortly be awarded an investment grade
rating. See Mullin, Tequila Hangover supra note 30; see also Murphy, supra note 36.
59. Khanna, supra note 54, at 13.
60. See Melvyn Westlake, Bradys Need a Little Time, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,
Oct. 1995, at 10 [hereinafter Wesflake, Little Time]; see also Asia Development Bank Re-
port-Equities-Poised to Enter a New Phase, INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 20, 1996; Mullin, Tequila
Hangover, supra note 30; Melvyn Westlake, Happy Days Return, EMERGING MARKETS INVES-
TOR, Oct. 1995.
61. See Keith Mullin, IMF/World Bank Report-Sovereign Borrowing-Picking and
Choosing, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 30, 1995.
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tine Brady bonds.6 2
The peso crisis and tequila effect led to dramatic growth in
asset securitization throughout the region. Companies from Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Mexico, and elsewhere raised funds through the
securitization of cash flows from export contracts for many prod-
ucts.6 3 Asset securitization proved to be an efficient and attrac-
tive way for emerging market entities to raise funds upon the
credit risk of the contractual counterparty from a developed na-
tion.
C. 1996 and All is Well: Let's Retire Brady Bonds and
Borrow Anew
Prosperity and relative stability returned to the market in
1996 and these factors, coupled to the relatively low interest
rates on offer, prompted debtors to seek to retire some of their
Brady bonds and liberate the capital tied up in their collateral,
and prompted a resurgence in syndicated lending to the emerg-
ing markets.
1. Brady Bond Exchanges
In April 1996 Mexico offered to exchange new thirty-year
global bonds for U.S. dollar-denominated Brady par and dis-
count bonds. The exchange was structured as a modified Dutch
auction and Mexico accepted offers for US$1.75 billion of the
new bonds at a spread of 552 basis points over U.S. Treasuries.
This gave a yield of 12.4%.64 The par bonds, which paid 6.25%,
were exchanged for US670 on the dollar and the discount
bonds, which paid LIBOR plus 13/16, at US80.60 . 65 This ex-
62. See Westlake, Little Time, supra note 60, at 10. Argentina's Brady bonds rallied
some 70% between their March 9 nadir and the re-election of a fiscally austere govern-
ment on May 9, but fell back later in the year. See Kevin Muehring, Looking for a Lasting
Relationship, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1995, at 45.
63. See Evans & Mullin, supra note 32.
64. The coupon was 11.5% and an issue price of 92.93% resulted in a yield of
12.4%.
65. The valuation of the Brady bonds generally ignored the Value Recovery Rights
(which provided for a higher coupon if Mexico's oil revenues rose above certain
benchmarks) and Goldman Sachs, somewhat controversially, ascribed very little value to
these rights even though, with high oil prices at the time, they were nearly in-the-
money. See Melvyn Westlake, Bidding Bradys Bye-bye, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, June
1996, at 15 [hereinafter Westlake, Bye-Bye]; see also Emerging Market Debt: Mid-500bp Con-
sensus Emerges-QTC Coming, INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 27, 1996; Mexican Debt. Warranted,
ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.) May 4, 1996, at 75.
2007]
196 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:185
change resulted in the retirement of some US$2.4 billion of
Brady bonds.6 6
The exchange offer removed one of the enduring anoma-
lies of the Brady bonds-the amalgamation of U.S. and emerg-
ing market sovereign risk in the one instrument. This hybrid
nature of Brady bonds always made them difficult to value, and,
while the zero coupon bonds which provided a partial interest
and principal guarantee could be stripped out (usually by short-
ing them), this was an expensive and inefficient process. In the
words of Merrill Lynch:
Brady bond structures were the result of complex negotia-
tions between the restructuring countries and commercial
bank advisory committees, with little consideration of their
future marketability to traditional bond buyers. In the case of
collateralized bonds, the result was a collection of inef-
ficiently bundled attributes whose resulting value to most in-
vestors is lower than the all-in servicing cost to the issuer ....
Given the .. .size of the Brady bond market, these structure
choices are probably among the costlier marketing mistakes
in bond history.6
7
The Brady bond exchange appealed to Mexico for four reasons:
1. It allowed Mexico to access some of the collateral tied up
in the Brady bonds. In the words of one Mexican fi-
nance ministry official: "It is inefficient to have $9 billion
of our cash invested in US Treasuries when we can invest
that money to cancel more expensive debt."
68
2. It reduced the stock of Mexican debt by US$1.25 bil-
lion-there was some US$600 million less of the new
bonds because the Bradys were exchanged at discounts
and the US$650 million of zero coupon bonds used as
collateral could now be used to retire short-term, and
more expensive, debt.69
3. The new bonds established the long end of an extended,
well-distributed, non-Brady yield curve for Mexican debt
66. 1 World Bank, Global Development Finance 1997, at 80 (1997) [hereinafter World
Bank, Development Finance 1997].
67. Merrill Lynch, Emerging Markets Debt Monthly, June 17, 1997, at 37.
68. See Westlake, Bye-bye, supra note 65, at 13.
69. See Most Innovative Deal-Adios Brady, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Jan. 1997,
at 21.
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and proved there was investor appetite for thirty-year
non-collateralized Mexican risk.
4. Mexican officials claimed a further inducement of the
exchange was to extend the tenor of their debt from
2019, when the Bradys were due to mature, to 2026.70 As
repayment of the Bradys was fully secured by zero-cou-
pon bonds, this is a spurious factor, although the ex-
change did, in facilitating the retirement of some
US$650 million of short-term debt, improve Mexico's
debt profile.
The exchange offer appealed principally to sophisticated institu-
tional investors which already held Brady bonds, but sought un-
diluted Mexican risk with higher yields.71 There was very little
participation by commercial banks and only around 24% of the
issue went to Mexican banks.72
Somewhat extraordinarily, Mexico's principal bankers for
the past century and the architect of its Aztec and Brady bonds,
JPMorgan, was not involved in this exchange, which was man-
aged by Goldman Sachs and co-managed by Salomon Brothers,
Chase Manhattan, and Deutsche Morgan Grenfell. The deal
represented a real coup for Goldman Sachs, never before a
noted emerging markets house.
As usual, Mexico's initiative established a trend. In Septem-
ber 1996 the Philippines gave Brady bond holders the option of
exchanging their twenty-five-year collateralized Brady bonds for
twenty-year fixed rate uncollateralized bonds. The Philippines
accepted US$635 million of the Brady bonds, one-third of those
outstanding, and US$137 million in new money as the new
bonds were also able to be acquired for cash.7 3
Brazil launched its Brady exchange in June 1997, issuing
70. See Westlake, Bye-bye, supra note 65, at 12; see also Mexico Offers Brady Bond Swap,
J. COM., Apr. 22, 1996, at 9A.
71. The appetite for pure sovereign risk had been established because the most
liquid Bradys tended to be the non-collateralized ones such as Argentina's FRBs and
Brazil's C bonds and, in Panama's Brady-style restructuring earlier in 1996, a majority of
creditors chose non-collateralized over collateralized bonds. See Paul Kilby, Pure Expo-
sure; Latin American Brady Bond Market, LATINFINANCE, June 1996, at 28.
72. See Emerging Market Bond-United Mexican States-Redrawing the Yield Curve,
INT'L FIN. REV., Review of the Year 1996, Dec. 21, 1996.
73. See Deals of the Year: Sovereign Bond Deal of the Year, ASIAMONEY, Feb. 1997, at 38;
see also Steven Irvine, No Expense Spared byJPMorgan on Brady, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1996, at
18.
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US$3 billion of thirty-year unsecured bonds priced at 395 basis
points over U.S. Treasuries.74  One-quarter of the new bonds
were sold for cash and the balance, US$2.25 billion, were
swapped for some US$2.7 billion of Brady bonds.75  The ex-
change, arranged by Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan, liberated
collateral worth US$605 million.7 6
In September 1997, only weeks before the contagion from
the Asian crisis spread through the emerging markets, Vene-
zuela effected the largest exchange to date. It swapped US$4.4
billion of Bradys for US$3.68 billion of new thirty-year bonds
with a coupon of 9.25%, and sold further new bonds for cash.7 7
The exchange retired over one-half of Venezuela's Brady
bonds.78 Argentina followed the leader, exchanging US$1.75
billion of new unsecured thirty-year bonds for its Brady bonds
and Bocones, domestic U.S. dollar-denominated bonds, and sell-
ing a further US$500 million of new bonds for cash. 79 Finally,
Panama rounded out a hectic September, swapping US$700 mil-
lion of new thirty-year bonds, at a spread only 250 basis points
above U.S. Treasuries, for its Brady bonds. This was a quite re-
markable transaction given that Panama's Brady-style restructur-
ing had only occurred in July 1996 and its Brady bonds were
then issued at a 565 basis point spread over U.S. Treasuries. °
2. The Return of Syndicated Lending
In mid-1991, John Reed, chairman of Citicorp, said that,
74. See The Year in Review: LatinFinance's Deal of the Year, LATINFINANCE, Jan. 1,
1998, at 35.
75. There was an incredible US$16 billion of orders placed for the US$750 million
of bonds sold for cash, so buyers received less than 5% of their orders. See Michael
Bender, Brazil Sells $3 Billion in Cash/Swap Deal, INv. DEALERS' Dic., June 9, 1997, at 12.
76. See id. at 12; see also Many Ways to Swap a Brady, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,
June 1997, at 4; Peter Truell, Brazilians Sell $3 Billion of Unsecured 30-year Debt, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1997, at D8.
77. See Venezuela Sells $4 Billion of 30-year Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1997, at D13;
see also Argentina, Venezuela to Accelerate Brady Demise, EUROWEEK, Sept. 5, 1997, at 1; Vene-
zuela Blows Barriers with $4 Billion Bond Exchange, EUROWEEK, Sept 12, 1997, at 1. This
exchange was expanded dramatically from its initial US$1 billion. See Venezuela Bids Fare-
well to Bradys, GLOBAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1997, at 17; Venezuela to Sell Post-Brady Bonds, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1997, D15.
78. Venezuela's was the largest unsecured sovereign global bond offering in his-
tory, exceeding Italy's US$3.5 billion issue in 1993.
79. Argentina Yields US$2.25 bn, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 13, 1997.
80. See Thomas T. Vogel Jr., Brady Bond Market Shrinks, in Boon for Latin Nations,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1997, at A16.
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notwithstanding the need of developing countries for capital,
the environment for cross-border lending was "inherently hos-
tile" and would not change for at least a decade."' He was
wrong. In 1990 there had been US$14.9 billion of commercial
bank loans to developing countries. The figure by 1996 was
US$36.5 billion, and in 1997 there were US$49.4 billion of com-
mercial bank loans to developing countries.8 " The reasons for
this re-emergence of lending to emerging markets are fourfold:
(a) The peso crisis and tequila effect in 1995 made bond issu-
ance difficult for many emerging markets debtors and the debt-
ors actively sought loans. Indeed, for the first time since the
debt crisis, in 1995 more capital was raised by loans than
bonds; 3 (b) Asia accounted for most of the loans-only US$25
billion of the total of US$135 billion went to Latin America-and
many of the loans were to private sector corporations, and some
were securitized by receivables;8 4 (c) the commercial banks had
been enjoying strong earnings for some time and were at peak
liquidity; and (d) generally there was lots of capital in the sys-
tem.85 As always, capital flows to emerging markets are deter-
mined by liquidity in the developed nations-the demand is
always there, it is the supply side that determines lending vol-
umes.
8 6
There were some significant differences between these loans
and those of the 1970s.8 7 The earlier loans were invariably un-
secured. The later loans were usually either secured in some
way, or, if to a sovereign, for a specific income producing pur-
pose. Security is most often attained by securitizing receivables
81. Reed: Banks Won't Lend to LDCs for a Decade or Longer, INT'L FIN. REv., July 6,
1991, at 29.
82. See 1 World Bank, Global Development Finance 1998, at 46 (1998) [hereinafter
World Bank, Development Finance 1998]; cf David Swafford, Debt Doldrums, LA-
TINFINANCE, May 1998, at 43 (giving the figure of US$59 billion for Latin America
alone).
83. See Emerging Market Debt-US$216 Bn Capital Flows, INT'L FIN. REV., Jan. 27,
1996; see also Mary Tobin, Inter-American Development Bank Report-Syndicated Loans-
Back to the Future? Not Likely!, INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 16, 1996.
84. See Tobin, supra note 83.
85. See id.; see also Swafford, supra note 82, at 43.
86. See Michael Pettis, The New Dance of the Millions, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1998, at
90; see also Ross Buckley, Six Lessons for Banking Regulators from the Asian Economic Crisis,
in PERSPECTrIVES ON BANKING, FINANCE & CREDIT LAW, at 9-12 (Weerasooria ed., 1999).
87. See generally Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-Border Lending: What's Different This Time?,
16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus., 44 (1995).
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or structuring the loan as project finance. The days of financing
the consolidated revenue of debtors are, thankfully, largely
gone. Syndicated lending even survived the Asian crisis-on
April 1, 1998 the Export Import Bank of Thailand signed a US$1
billion facility with sixty-four banks priced at eighty basis points
over LIBOR, admittedly supported by a guarantee from the
Asian Development Bank.88
Citibank was the first to establish a specialist trading desk
for emerging markets loans in March 1997. Other active institu-
tions now include Chase Manhattan, JPMorgan, ING Barings,
and Merrill Lynch. The difference between these and conven-
tional emerging markets desks, which while principally dealing
in bonds still do deal in loans, is that the new desks deal with
syndicated loans made in the previous few years which trade at
par and are performing-or, at least, which did and were until
the Asian crisis.89 As one would expect, the market was still thin
and bid-offer spreads relatively wide at one-quarter to one-half a
point.90
A new industry body, the Loan Syndications and Trading
Association, was established in New York in late 1995 to promote
and regulate secondary market trading in U.S. and European
bank loans,9 and the Loan Market Association was founded in
London in 1996 to foster secondary market loan trading in Eu-
rope. Each association has devoted considerable attention to
trading in emerging markets loans, 92 which is interesting given
the considerable overlap with the Emerging Market Traders As-
sociation's ("EMTA") work.93 EMTA provided organizational
and other technical support to the Loan Syndications and Trad-
ing Association in its early years.94
88. See Paul Farrow, Asia Regional Report-Asian Borrowers-Limited Access for All but
a Few, INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 18, 1998.
89. See Swafford, supra note 82, at 43.
90. See Peter Eavis, The Newest Game in Town, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, July-
Aug. 1997, at 12.
91. See Loan Syndications and Trading Association, Inc. Website, http://www.lsta
.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
92. See Eavis, supra note 90, at 12.
93. See generally Ross Buckley, The Role and Potential of Self-Regulatory Organisations:
The Emerging Markets Traders Association from 1990-2000, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 135
(2000).
94. See Emerging Markets Traders Association ("EMTA"), Bulletin, 3rd Quarter
1996, at 7, http://www.emta.org/bulletin/3qtr96.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
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Accounts of this "emerging" secondary market in emerging
markets loans make amusing reading. Articles written in 1997
with titles like The Newest Game in Town present secondary loan
trading and the problems in trading loans as opposed to bonds
as if they were novel and not the daily fare of this market in the
1980s. 95 The financial markets have a radioactive memory, with
a very short half-life.
D. 1997: The Asian Economic Crisis
Few predicted the economic crisis that commenced in Asia
in 1997,96 and almost no one predicted its severity.9 7 Western
capital had poured into emerging markets in record quantities
in the preceding two years. Emerging markets stocks and bonds
were being acquired by investors scornful of the low interest
rates on offer in their home countries and fearful that the U.S.
stock market had reached unsustainable heights.98 The substan-
tial risks, which history as recent as 1995 taught were inherent in
emerging markets instruments, were simply not being factored
into their pricing. This meant any generalized market scare was
likely to have a major impact. It did.
The Asian problems began in Thailand in June 1997 and
soon spread throughout the region. Nonetheless, it was not un-
til October that the currency crisis, as it was then termed, deep-
ened across the sector. Whether it is Wall Street in 1929 or 1987,
or this secondary market in every year between 1991 and 1997,99
October seems a bad month for financial markets. Perhaps this
is due to the tendency of many trading accounts to begin to
95. Eavis, supra note 90, at 12. Peter Eavis presents, as new, issues such as banks
not selling from their own balance sheets and requiring traders to sell from their own
portfolios, the difficulties of trading loans as opposed to bonds, the need for standard-
ized documents, and the need for confidentiality so banks are not seen to be selling a
customer's paper. See id. at 12. All of these issues characterized the secondary market in
the 1980s before the loans were securitized into Brady bonds. See Buckley, Transforma-
tive Potential, supra note 1, at 1156-57.
96. But see Jennifer Hewitt, The Money Trap, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 21,
1998, § 6, at 1.
97. The Asian economic crisis has been described by the IMF as "one of the worst
financial crises in the postwar period." International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), World
Economic Outlook, May 1998, at 3 [hereinafter IMF, Economic Outlook 1998].
98. See Paul Blustein, Investors Reconsider Big Emerging-Markets Bets, WAsH. PosT, July
20, 1997, at HI.
99. See Merrill Lynch, Emerging Markets Debt Monthly, Sept. 19, 1997, at 4.
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book the profits made that year in advance of the year end. ° °
Whatever the cause, "beware the ides of October" should per-
haps be tattooed on every fund manager's and trader's forearm:
The major U.S. banks alone reportedly lost some US$400 mil-
lion trading in the emerging markets in October 1997.101
The precipitating event this October was intense specula-
tion on the Hong Kong dollar which, in turn, triggered a sus-
tained plunge in Hong Kong share prices. 10 2 Once the conta-
gion spread, it spread widely, to London and Wall Street and
throughout the emerging markets.'0 3 Brazil's Brady bonds fell
in value 17% in the last ten days of October and leading Latin
American mutual funds lost seventeen to 20% of their value in a
week. 104 It was as if Asia was retaliating for the tequila effect of
1995 by sending emerging markets globally into a tailspin,0 5
and, just as in 1995, while the economic correlations between
regions were weak, the psychological correlations were strong.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico were all affected, with Bra-
zil the hardest hit as it shared problems like a large current ac-
count deficit with the troubled Asian countries. Quick strong
action by Brazilian authorities and prompt action by the authori-
ties in the other countries, principally by tightening monetary
and fiscal policies, restored market confidence and staunched
the drain on foreign exchange reserves.10 6 Accordingly, the con-
tagion did not significantly damage the domestic economies of
Latin American countries, or East European ones for that mat-
ter. That East Asia's hangover did not spread to other emerging
100. See Andrew Capon, Simion Romijn, Baring Asset Management, GLOBAL INVESTOR,
Dec. 1997-Jan. 1998, at 30.
101. See Thor Valdmanis, Banks Take $400 Mn Hit on Emerging Market, USA TODAY,
Nov. 20, 1997, at lB.
102. See Peter Chan, Banks Jittery overEmerging Market Debt, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 29, 1997, at 3.
103. The New York Stock Exchange fell 7% on October 27, and this sent the
emerging markets sprawling. See Alison Warner, Re-emerging from a Crisis; Asian Currency
Effects on Emerging Debt Market, BANKER, Apr. 1998, at 40.
104. See Edward Wyatt, The Manic Market: An Investor's Guide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1997, § 3, at 9. Scudder Latin America lost 17% of its value in the last week of October,
Fidelity Latin America lost 18% and T. Rowe Price International Latin America lost
nearly 20%. See id.; see also Timothy L. O'Brien, The Market Turmoil: The Risks, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1997, at D1.
105. See Emerging-market Debt. Tigers' Revenge, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Nov. 1, 1997,
at 78.
106. See IMF, Economic Outlook 1998, supra note 97, at 16; see also 1 World Bank,
Development Finance 1998, supra note 82, at 42.
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markets on anything like the scale of the tequila effect suggested
a pleasing maturation in the secondary market. 10 7 Nonetheless,
the shift in investor perception of the risk inherent in emerging
market assets means that corporations and sovereigns from these
nations are now paying substantially higher interest premia to
raise capital.
The sell-off was so intense that many brokerages were over-
whelmed, and EMTA recommended that brokerages close thirty
minutes earlier on October 29.108 An indication of the volatility
is given by the composite stripped spread on JPMorgan's Emerg-
ing Market Bond Index, which went from a pre-crisis 334 basis
points on October 22 to 695 basis points by November 12.'09
Nonetheless, while a doubling in spreads is extreme, the Octo-
ber sell-off was, in part, merely correcting the anomalous and
grossly excessive spread compression which had characterized
the market since 1996.
The panic selling that had characterized the market in early
1995 was less prevalent in October 1997.11° This time the institu-
tional investors showed the maturity and belief in the market
that everyone wished they had shown two years earlier. None-
theless, while many institutional investors did not dump large
chunks of their portfolios in late 1997, neither did they return at
all quickly to the market to increase their exposure to the sec-
tor.111 While traders were pleased with, and somewhat proud of,
this new-found maturity of the market's principal investors, the
market itself decayed quite severely in October 1997. The error
rate in matching trades was unacceptably high, which delayed
the settlement of many trades, and bid-offer spreads widened
dramatically to well over two percentage points.'1 2
The crisis turned the clock back in the secondary market.
107. See IMF, Economic Outlook 1998, supra note 97, at 48 ("An interesting feature of
the emerging market crisis of 1997-98 is that the effects of the Asian crisis on Latin
America have been relatively limited.").
108. See O'Brien, supra note 104, at D1.
109. SeeJim Sullivan, Latin American Regional Report-Brady Bonds-Rapid Rebound
in Sentiment, INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 7, 1998, at 8; see also Warner, supra note 103, at 40.
110. See Latin Pipeline Empties as Spreads Crash in Face of Emerging Debt Market Sell-off,
EUROWEEK, Oct. 31, 1997, at 7.
111. See Danielle Robinson, Crunch Timefor Emerging Markets, EUROWEEK, Jan. 1998,
at 240.
112. See Andrew Capon &Julian Marshall, After the Storm: Stephen Freidheim, Bankers
Trust, GLOBAL INNESTOR, Dec. 1997-Jan. 1998, at 29.
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As many of the most recent new investors left the market and
spreads widened, the traditional emerging markets money re-
turned. 1 3 Spreads of emerging markets bonds over comparable
U.S. Treasuries averaged 5% in March 1998, compared to 3.3%
before the Asian troubles.114 The Asian Crisis also turned back
the clock further in other ways, back as far as 1982 in fact. Once
again, when trouble broke, the international banks turned off
the tap on new lending so decisively that a crisis became inevita-
ble. The five most troubled Asian countries received US$100 bil-
lion less in 1997 than in 1996, with South Korea alone receiving
US$50 billion less.' 15 Many top U.S. corporations would struggle
to survive such diminished access to debt financing; its impact
on developing nations was drastic.
While poor prudential regulation in the debtor countries
and misjudgements among creditors clearly contributed to the
crisis, this was in no conventional sense a debt crisis. 116 It was
initially a currency crisis' 17 and developed into a more genera-
lized economic crisis, at least for Indonesia, Thailand, and Ko-
rea, the three most severely affected countries." 8 However,
while this was not a regional debt crisis, indebtedness did play a
role in the troubles. The stock of debt in the region increased
12% in each of 1995 and 1996,"' and private commercial debt
(debt not backed by a sovereign guarantee) increased a remarka-
113. See Robinson, supra note 111, at 240; see alsoJerry Edgerton, Rebounding Emerg-
ing Markets Bond Funds Offer Lofty Yields-If You Can Handle the Risks, MONEY, May 1998,
at 42.
114. See Mary Beth Grover, Civil Wars and Bedbugs, FORBES, Mar. 9, 1998, at 219.
115. See Edmund Andrews, Panicky Western Financiers Turned a Problem into a Crisis,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 1, 1998, at 21.
116. Debt crises are generally characterized by total debt to exports ratios of over
200% and debt service to exports ratios of over 20%. The respective ratios for East Asia
and the Pacific were 99% and 12% in 1996. Regional averages can, of course, mislead;
within the region, Indonesia's 1996 debt to exports ratio of 220% and its debt service to
export ratio of 34% suggest a debt crisis for that country. See 1 World Bank, Development
Finance 1997, supra note 66, at 160-61. However, the debt to exports ratios of Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand were all substantially lower than those of Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Mexico in 1996. Indeed, the debt to exports ratios for East Asia and
the Pacific in 1997 was 103%, compared to Latin America's average ratio of 193%. See
id. at 33, 128.
117. See Merrill Lynch, supra note 99, at 19.
118. See generally IMF, Economic Outlook 1998, supra note 97. Malaysia and the Phil-
ippines were substantially less affected. See id. at 62.
119. See I World Bank, Development Finance 1997, supra note 66, at 160.
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ble 50% from January 1995 to December 1996.121
1. Short-Term Debt
Short-term indebtedness increased significantly in 1995 and
1996 across the region, although the increase was concentrated
in China, Indonesia, and Thailand. 21 The rapid increase in
short-term debt in East Asia was not matched by Latin America,
as seen in Figure One below-perhaps one of the few benefits of
Mexico's peso crisis and the tequila effect. Indeed, it is likely
that short-term debt flows to East Asia in 1995, 1996, and early
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120. See id. at 160; see also Rudi Dornbusch, The Sunny Side of Crises, J. COM., Sept.
15, 1997, at 7A.
121. See 1 World Bank, Development Finance 1997, supra note 66, at 160.
122. See Ross Buckley, An Oft-Ignored Perspective on the Asian Economic Crisis: The Role
of Creditors and Investors, 15 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 431, 435 (2000).
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The World Bank has concluded that, "[t]he buildup of
short-term, unhedged debt left East Asian economies vulnerable
to a sudden collapse of confidence . . .The loss of confidence
led to capital outflows, and thus to depreciating currencies and
falling asset prices, which further strained private balance sheets
and so proved self-fulfilling."' 23
The build-up of short-term debt was not a region-wide phe-
nomenon. The ratio of short-term debt to total debt in the
countries of the region in mid-1997 ranged from 67% in Korea
and 46% in Thailand, to 24% in Indonesia, and 19% in the Phil-
ippines. 124
The proliferation of investment in local currency local in-
struments definitely intensified the global contagion. The Asian
Crisis began as a currency crisis, and the decimation a substantial
devaluation causes to a local currency portfolio naturally prompt-
ed a severe sell-off at the first sign of trouble. This was com-
pounded by the tendency of many local currency local instru-
ments to be of short duration for which, as the storm clouds
gathered, the prospects of refinancing were slight.125
E. 1998: The Secondary Market Fails to Implode
The big events in 1998 were the Russian repayment morato-
rium on foreign debt and devaluation of the rouble in August
and the collapse of the major hedge fund, Long-Term Capital
Management, in September. In Frederic Haller's words:
Last year [1998] was just about the worst that the emerging
debt market has ever experienced. In particular, the Russian
debacle in August. . . was the defining moment of 1998.126
In stark contrast to Asia the previous year, the contagion from
Russia's crisis was severe, far eclipsing the tequila effect of
1995. 127
123. 1 World Bank, Development Finance 1998, supra note 82, at 31.
124. See id. at 35.
125. See Brice Minnigh et al., Asian Dominoes-Mandate Mooted, Irr'L FIN. REV., Jan.
10, 1998.
126. Frederic Haller, IMFMisled Us, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Feb. 1999, at 1.
127. See Kiss of Life, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,Jan. 1999, at 10. For instance, in
the primary market in November and the first half of December 1998, twenty-three debt
deals and three equity deals were completed. In the same period in 1997, the numbers
were sixty-five and twenty-eight, respectively. See id. at 10.
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1. The Russian Collapse
By 1998 Russia's economic and political problems had been
mounting for some years. The radical reforms required to allow
markets, not bureaucrats, to allocate resources were proving
problematic for this former command economy burdened, as it
was, with a deteriorating current account, tax collection
problems, debt management problems, low oil prices, and indus-
trial unrest.1 28 In addition, there was considerable political insta-
bility arising principally from a sizeable bloc in parliament who
sought to return the economy to the old system. Coupled to all
this were the risk weightings under the Basel Capital Adequacy
Accord which made loans to Russia attractive by weighting loans
to OECD sovereigns at zero. 129 In the words of one senior
banker, "your average loan commitment officer could hit his re-
turn on capital targets much easier offering money to Boris
[Yeltsin] than he could lending to GECC."'13
In May 1998, declining investor confidence forced the Cen-
tral Bank to raise interest rates to support the ruble. By July the
central bank had been forced into extensive sales of its hard cur-
rency reserves to defend the ruble. In mid-August 1998, the Rus-
sian Central Bank announced a widening of the band in which
the ruble would be allowed to float. In effect this was a devalua-
tion. In addition, the government declared a ninety-day morato-
rium on the servicing of foreign debt by Russian firms.' Al-
though most headlines at the time focussed upon the devalua-
tion, the issue of vital concern to investors was the moratorium.
Devaluations are a market risk; moratoria are a political one,
which in this case was seen as a policy choice to favor local banks
over foreign investors.1 1 2
While Russia's economic problems had been apparent for
some considerable time, the market believed Russia would not
128. See Ray Barrell et al., Financial Market Contagion and the Effects of the Crises in
East Asia, Russia and Latin America, NAT'L INST. ECON. REv., Oct. 1998, at 57; see also Paul
Farrow, A Bear with a Sore Head-Russia, INT'L FIN. REV., Review of the Year 1998, Dec.
19, 1998, at 48.
129. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSAC-
TIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 236-38 (9th ed. 2002).
130. Alex Crossman, Roller-coaster Ride Is far from Over-World Crisis, INr'L FIN. REv.,
Review of the Year 1998, Dec. 19, 1998, at 20.
131. See Barrell et al., supra note 128, at 57.
132. See Edmund Andrews, International Business: Russia Is Caught in a Financial
Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, at D5.
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be allowed to fail. In the words of Desmond Lachman: "Bulga-
ria didn't fail. Thailand didn't fail. Indonesia didn't fail. But
now Russia fails .... [T] he IMF and the Group of Seven are no
longer there as a backstop. 13 3 In essence, the Russian crisis was
a classic instance of moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when-
ever a situation rewards investors for financial misbehavior.13 4 In
the case of Russia, investors expected to be bailed out. In the
words, again, of Desmond Lachman:
Anybody who questions that Russia's fundamentals were wor-
thy of investment... wasn't operating in the markets at the
time . . .Most [investors] who did take positions on Russia
were doing this on the argument that Russia was too big to
fail and that the G-7 nations would . . . bail them out.13 5
The proper operation of the market, which may have led to a
more gradual withdrawal from investing in Russia, was pro-
foundly affected by the moral hazard of an anticipated bail-
out.1 3 6 Russia's geo-political significance, in particular, meant
investors were very confident that it would not be allowed to de-
fault on its financial obligations. 13 7 Indeed, even four months
later, EMTA's co-chair, Frederic Haller, was railing that, "[t]he
failure of the IMF and G-7 to show timely leadership in Russia in
August may prove to be the biggest international policy mistake
of the post-Cold War era."1 8
The extraordinary aspect of Russia's crisis was the fallout
from it. Russia's economy is not large, about the size of Spain's
133. 1998; A Year Emerging Markets Seem Synonymous with Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1998, at DI (quoting Desmond Lachman, head of emerging markets research at
Salomon Smith Barney).
134. See generally Lee C. Buchheit, Moral Hazards and Other Delights, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Apr. 1991, at 11.
135. IMF Economic Forum, Financial Markets: Coping with Turbulence, Wash., D.C.,
Dec. 1, 1998, http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1998/TR981201.HTM (last visited
Nov. 16, 2006).
136. See Timothy O'Brien, When Economic Bombs Drop, Risk Models Fail, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1998, § 3, at 4; see also Splendid Isolation No Longer, INT'L FIN. REV., Aug. 15, 1998,
at 1.
137. See Jonathon Fuerbringer, After Russian Lesson, Bond Prices Remain Stable in
Latest Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at Cl ("Many [investors] refused to believe the
United States and the International Monetary Fund would allow Russia to collapse until
it actually happened.").
138. EMTA, Bulletin, 1st Quarter 1999, at 1, http://www.emta.org/bulletin/Iqtr99
.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006). The other view is that the IMF could not lend "into the
jaws of a completely irrational monetary policy," in the words of Eric Krause. Apocalypse
Nowt EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Feb. 1999, at 4.
[Vol. 30:185
A FORCE FOR GLOBALIZATION
or Switzerland's.139 Yet the consequences of Russia's devaluation
and moratorium were to stand the international bond markets
on their heads. 4 In August, emerging markets debt fell over
28% in value, high-yield bonds fell over 7%, and real estate in-
vestment trusts that invested in mortgage securities fell about
27%. Meanwhile, U.S. Treasury bonds increased over 2%.141
Russia's collapse resulted in a tremendous flight to quality, and
this time investors went all the way to the security of U.S. Trea-
suries.1 42 Even the bonds of the blue chip corporate sector of-
fered insufficient security to bondholders in August and Septem-
ber 1998.
How can one explain such profound effects from the events
in one small to middling economic power? In part, the answer
lies in the approaches to risk of the large investors, and this fac-
tor has three elements.
The first was an over-reliance on the then new, sophisticated
risk management techniques. Many funds and other investors,
believing they could calculate their risk levels precisely, strove
for yield and discounted risk as something that was now manage-
able. 143 However, contemporary risk management models as-
sume a high level of liquidity, t4 4 which history teaches us may
not be there in times of crisis in the emerging markets and
which was missing in August and September 1998.
The second element of the risk strategies of large investors
was the common strategy of hedging against losses in emerging
markets debt by going short on U.S. Treasuries,1 45 on the as-
sumption that prices of emerging markets and U.S. bonds histor-
ically moved in tandem. 46 The flight to quality that followed
Russia's collapse sent the yield on thirty-year U.S. Treasuries to
the lowest levels since the United States began issuing the bonds
139. See Emerging Markets, Weight Problem, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Oct. 31, 1998, at
80.
140. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Markets: Shocks and Aftershocks, The Bear Is Ram-
pant in the Markets for Riskier Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1998, at C1.
141. See id.; see also Emma Clark, Russian Crisis Rocks US Bank Debt Mart, Hedge Funds
Sell, BANK LETTER, Aug. 31, 1998, at 1.
142. See Clark, supra note 141, at 1.
143. See Robert Clow, Back Basics, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1 1999, at 87.
144. See Crossman, supra note 130, at 20.
145. See Morgenson, supra note 140, at C1.
146. See O'Brien, supra note 136, § 3, at 4.
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on a regular basis in 1977,'17 while the yields on emerging mar-
kets bonds soared. As bond yield and price are inversely related,
investors adopting this strategy found themselves long on emerg-
ing markets bonds which were falling in price rapidly and short
on U.S. Treasuries which were increasing in price. As we shall
see, this was a pincer sufficient to squeeze the capital out of even
the biggest hedge funds.
The third element of the risk strategies of large investors
was their appetite for leverage. Investors with highly leveraged
positions in Russian assets were forced to sell other assets to
cover margin calls or otherwise repay the debt incurred to invest
in Russian debt. The other assets sold were most often, though
not always,"" in other emerging markets. 49 Accordingly, the
continued appetite for leverage among many investors in the
emerging markets means that a severe fall in one emerging mar-
ket rebounds through the entire market, almost irrespective of
the economic health of the other sectors.1 50
Another part of the reason Russia's actions had such far-
reaching consequences was that its heavy debt issuance had
given it a high profile in the principal index. By spring of 1998,
Russian debt accounted for one-seventh of JPMorgan's Emerg-
ing Markets Bond Index Plus. A "neutral" investment position
for an investor would therefore have seen it with one-seventh of
its emerging markets portfolio in Russia. As The Economist
pointed out: "This is a result of the perverse logic of bond indi-
ces. A country that has issued a lot of debt will be weighted heav-
ily in the index, even though it may be borrowing its way into
147. See Sharon King, Stocks and Bonds; Foreign Turmoil Drives Investors from Dow to
Treasuries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at D5; see also U.S. Treasuries-All-Time Low, INT'L
FIN. REV., Aug. 22, 1998, at 9; U.S. Treasuries-Lower Still?, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 12,
1998, at 12.
148. See Clark, supra note 141, at 1. Some hedge funds sold U.S. bank debt to
cover emerging markets losses. See id.
149. See Yang Won-il, Raising Funds Overseas More Difficult; Russia's Financial
Meltdown Exacerbates Situation, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 10, 1998.
150. Compare Onelia Collazo, Latin Bond Drop Mires Region in Crisis, LATINFINANCE,
Sept. 1998, at 14 (noting the reverberation of the bond drop in Venezuela throughout
the market for emerging markets debt), with Barbara Wall, One Investor's Delight May Be
Another's Nightmare; For Bondholders, Down May Not Be Up After All, IN'T'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 30, 1999, at 15 (citing Mohammed El Erian's argument that Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland, South Korea, and Thailand are only lowly correlated with the other emerging
markets).
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trouble." '151
The remarkable capital drain that followed Russia's actions
exposed the continuing immaturity of the market, as fund man-
agers once again showed no significant ability to discriminate be-
tween emerging economies that had been successfully reformed
and those which had not.15 2
The response to East Asia's financial troubles and Russia's
devaluation and moratorium also highlights the extent to which
the increased globalization of financial markets has exposed the
emerging markets to sudden and severe reversals in capital
flows. 1 5 3
2. The Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
Coming hard on the heels of Russia's crisis, this collapse fur-
ther rocked the market.1 54 The collapse was caused principally
by the hedge fund taking a huge position on the assumption that
the already very wide spreads on emerging markets debt and
high-yield bonds would return to their more customary levels.
The fund went short on U.S. Treasuries and long on emerging
markets bonds, high-yield bonds, and European government
bonds. As we have seen, the turmoil in Russia caused a flood of
capital into U.S. Treasuries and out of the emerging markets sec-
tor. Similar outflows from high-yield and European government
bonds meant that the hedge fund got squeezed so hard its capi-
tal ran out.
The rescue package coordinated by the U.S. Federal Re-
serve required an effective US$3.5 billion buyout of the fund by
a consortium of banks and brokers. 15 For the hedge fund's
principal financiers, this was apparently a cheaper option than
allowing it to fail.
151. Emerging Markets, Weight Problem, supra note 139, at 80.
152. See David Wernick, Riders on the Storm, LATINFINANCE, Mar. 1, 1999, at 70.
153. IMF, World Economic Outlook 1999, May 1999, at 31-38 [hereinafter IMF, Eco-
nomic Outlook 1999].
154. See Long-Term Sickness?, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Oct. 3, 1998, at 81.
155. See Gretchen Morgenson, Fallen Star: The Overview; Hedge Fund Bailout Rattles
Investors and Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at A1; see also Gretchen Morgenson,
Billion-Dollar Bettor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at C1.
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F. 1999: Brazil Sambas Its Way Out of Trouble
The most significant event for the market in 1999 was Bra-
zil's allowing its currency, the real, to float in January.
1. Brazil's Devaluation
Much like a fine wine, Brazil's troubles had been a long
time fermenting.'56 In November 1997, in the sell-off that fol-
lowed East Asia's troubles, Brazilian debt performed the worst of
the major debtors, with the spread on its bonds widening by 453
basis points as against 405 basis points for Argentina and 262 for
Mexico.1 57 In the first half of September 1998, an extraordinary
US$14 billion departed the country's foreign exchange market.
The Central Bank lifted the basic lending rate to 49.75% on Sep-
tember 10, just one week after lifting it to 29.75%, and spent its
foreign exchange reserves heavily to defend the value of the
real. 1 8 In November, Brazil and the IMF reached agreement on
US$41 billion in aid to bolster the nation's finances. 1 9 This
package was specifically aimed at heading off a devaluation due
to the fear such a prospect engendered in the wake of Russia's
troubles.
The real had been kept overvalued to combat inflation and
to continue compliance with the real plan, which called for a
slow depreciation of the real of between 0.58 and 0.68% per
month. The real had been introduced in 1994, and the real
plan had succeeded in defeating the ruinous hyperinflation
which had previously dogged Brazil.' 6 ° The considerable com-
mitment of politicians to it was therefore understandable.
However, by January 1999, Brazil could no longer afford to
defend its currency: It had used over one-half of its foreign ex-
change reserves doing so in the previous six months, and two
weeks earlier one of its largest states had decided to withhold
payments on debt to the Brazilian government. On January 15,
the government let the currency float, and it fell in value 17%
156. See Leon Lazaroff, The Debt Roulette, LATINFiNANCE, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 23.
157. See Sullivan, supra note 109, at 8.
158. See Ermina Karim, IMFIWorld Bank Report-All Eyes on Brazil, INT'L FIN. REV.,
Oct. 1998, at 189.
159. See Jeremy Weintraub, Emerging Markets-Brazil Floats Real, Forecasts Improve,
INT'L FIN. REv., Jan. 16, 1999.
160. See Gabriel Juan DeSanctis, IMFIWorld Bank Report-Fundamentals Under Fire-
Latin American Currencies, INT'L FIN. REv., Oct. 1998, at 181.
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against the U.S. dollar in a week and about one-third in the first
quarter of 1999."6
The fallout from Brazil's devaluation was not nearly as se-
vere as that from Russia's devaluation and moratorium only five
months earlier.162 Argentine and Mexican assets suffered, but
not to the extent that many had feared.1 6' Given that Brazilian
debt has historically been the linchpin of the secondary market,
the reasons for this limited fallout are illuminating.
First, in light of the Russian debacle, investors had (a) re-
duced their exposure to emerging markets in general and to
Brazil in particular, as it had been showing signs of trouble since
October 1997, and (b) reduced their leverage so that losses in
Brazil did not force consequential asset sales to the same extent
as in August.164
Second, the central participants in Brazilian debt were the
major international banks, which had far deeper and more di-
versified portfolios than the hedge funds that had dominated in-
vestment into Russia. 165
Third, the moral hazard of an expected bail-out did not in-
fluence the market in Brazil. A US$41.5 billion financial pack-
age had been put in place by the IMF in late 1998, and investors
were adjusting their portfolios uninfluenced by the prospect of
any further rescues. Indeed, Brazil's abandonment of the real
had to some extent been anticipated.166
Finally, floating the currency was welcomed by many in the
161. See Tim Padgett, Brazil's Big Bounce, TIME (Austl. ed.), Jan. 25, 1999, at 34.
162. See World Economic Outlook 1999, supra note 153, at I ("Financial contagion
from the Brazilian crisis has been limited.").
163. In the words of Tanya Azarchs, an analyst at Standard & Poor's, in December
1998: "If Brazil devalues, the impact on the financial community would be bigger than
when Russia simultaneously devalued and defaulted in August." Wake Me When It's Over,
EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Dec. 1998-Jan. 1999, at 6; see also Asia: Risks and Uncertain-
ties in 1999, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT REP., Apr. 26, 1999, at 1; Alison Warner, Emerging
into the Shadows, BANKER, Mar. 1, 1999, at 22.
164. SeeJonathon Fuerbringer, After Russian Lesson, Bond Prices Remain Stable in Lat-
est Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at Cl; see also Timothy L. O'Brien & Joseph Kahn,
U.S. Financial Industry May Already Have Fortified Itself against the Latest Emerging-market
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at C8.
165. See Fuerbringer, supra note 164, at Cl. The hedge funds that were active in
Brazil had reduced their exposure since the events in Russia. See O'Brien & Kahn, supra
note 164, at C8.
166. See IMF, Economic Outlook 1999, supra note 153, at 29; see also O'Brien & Kahn,
supra note 164, at C8; Warner, supra note 163, at 22.
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financial markets who believed the real to be overvalued. In the
words of Arturo Porzecanski: "This is what we'd been hoping
for. The government had the courage to let the currency find its
own level." '167
Encouragingly, after Brazil's devaluation investors quickly
differentiated between Latin American countries with sound ec-
onomic fundamentals such as Argentina, Mexico, and Chile and
those without, such as Brazil itself, Ecuador, and Venezuela.16
The lack of strong contagion across the region speaks to the in-
creasing sophistication and maturity of the market. Indeed, if
one could somehow ignore the sheer panic that Russia's devalua-
tion engendered, and simply focus upon the secondary market's
reaction to East Asia's woes in 1997 and Brazil's in 1999, one
might well conclude that the market was approaching maturity.
The fallout from Russia in which the market relapsed into its old
bad habits of "looking at all 'emerging markets' from Santiago to
Seoul through a single lens" was merely unfortunate.
1 69
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARKET
A. Growth of the Market
This period begins with the market coming out of the most
rapid growth spurt in its history. Reported turnover for 1994 was
US$2.77 trillion face value of debt, an increase of some 40% over
1993 and nearly four times 1992 turnover. 17' The brakes came
on hard in 1995, with turnover stalled at US$2.74 trillion. 171
Rapid growth returned in 1996, with turnover nearly doubling to
US$5.3 trillion, and then rising slowly to US$5.9 trillion in
1997.172 In 1998, the Asian and Russian crises asserted them-
selves, and turnover fell some 29% to US$4.2 trillion. 17 In 1999,
turnover was US$2.185 trillion. 174 This turnover history is repre-
167. Weintraub, supra note 159.
168. See For Who Is Living if Those Two Are Gone?, W. MERCHANT BANK INVESTMENT
REV., Feb. 3, 1999, at 3.
169. Khanna, supra note 54, at 13; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
170. See EMTA, 1994 Debt Trading Volume Survey, May 1, 1995.
171. See EMTA, 1996 Debt Trading Volume Survey, Supplemental Analysis, Mar. 17,
1997, at I [hereinafter EMTA, 1996 Survey].
172. See EMTA, 1997 Debt Trading Volume Survey, Supplementary Analysis, Feb. 25,
1998, at 9 [hereinafter EMTA, 1997 Survey].
173. See EMTA, 1998 Debt Trading Volume Survey, Supplementary Analysis, Feb. 22,
1999, at 8 [hereinafter EMTA 1998 Survey].
174. See EMTA, 2000 Debt Trading Volume Survey, Survey Highlights, Feb. 7, 2001.
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175. As is the custom in the industry, these figures are not adjusted for the
significant amount of double-counting involved in their compilation. The figures come
from the annual trading volume surveys of the market conducted by the EMTA (which
is also the source for the reported custom in the industry). The figures are compiled by
surveying regular participants in the market which involves an element of double-
counting as a single piece of debt may well be counted in the turnover of its seller and
purchaser. This built-in tendency to overestimation is commonplace in the trading
volumes of major capital markets, so these figures serve quite well for comparative
purposes. If one is interested in the net amount of debt which changed hands in the
market, these figures should be discounted by a factor of about one-third. See Buckley,
Brady Plan, supra note 1, at 1876-77. This adjustment, over time, has tended to bring
EMTA's figures into line with the estimates of market participants. A one-third
discount suggests an actual turnover in 1994 of some US$1.85 trillion face value of
debt-close to the Emerging Markets Investor survey which put market turnover at around
US$2 trillion. See Melvyn Westlake, Shaken, Not Stirred, EMERGING MARKETS INvESTOR,
Mar. 1995, at 11 [hereinafter Westlake, Shaken]. Firms surveyed by LatinFinance in its
annual secondary market survey estimated turnover for 1994 at US$2.47 trillion. See
Paul Kilby, Growing Pains: Debt Market Survives Bumps and Bruises on Its Way to Maturity,
LATINFINANCE, Mar. 1995, at 60. A one-third discount to allow for double counting has
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Emerging markets debt represents a small part of the world's
capital markets. In September 1998, the capitalization of JPMor-
gan's Emerging Markets Bond Index ("EMBI"), the market stan-
dard, was U$71 billion. The EMBI covers only U.S. dollar-de-
nominated Brady bonds, and not the non-Brady bonds, local
currency instruments, and loans which comprise the balance of
this market. Nonetheless, the total capitalization of the emerg-
ing markets debt market would be, on this basis, about US$2.2
trillion. 176
B. Types of Debt Traded
The market in this period traded five principal types of as-
sets: Brady bonds, newly issued (non-Brady) bonds, local instru-
ments, derivatives, and loans. Local instruments are bonds de-
nominated in either U.S. dollars or local currency, but issued in
the local market, not internationally. The respective turnover of
these types of assets in 1997 and 1998 is set forth below.
TABLE ONE - TURNOVER OF VARIOUS TYPES OF EMERGING
MARKETS DEBT
Asset Type 1997 Turnover
1 7 7  1998 Turnover 1 7 8
(Face Amounts in Billions of US $)
Brady Bonds 2,403 1,541
Non-Brady Bonds1 7 9  1,335 1,021
Local Instruments1 80  1,506 1,176
Debt Options and Warrants 365 233
Loans 305 213
The secondary market began its life as a swap market for loans,
as virtually all the debt of the debt crisis of 1982 took the form of
syndicated loans. As the market matured, swaps gave way to
also been proposed by others. See, e.g., Mullin, Majors Hang Tough, supra note 13; see also
Emerging Markets Trading Association, Emerging Markets Trading and Investment (2002),
http://emta.org/ar2000/t_i.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Emerging
Markets Trading and Investment].
176. See Emerging Markets Trading and Investment, supra note 175.
177. See EMTA, 1997 Survey, supra note 172, at 7.
178. See EMTA, 1998 Survey, supra note 173, Supplementary Analysis, at 8.
179. The non-Brady bonds turnover comprised US$923 billion of sovereign bonds
and US$389 billion of corporate bonds. See EMTA, 1997 Survey, supra note 172, Supple-
mentary Analysis, at 9.
180. The turnover of local instruments comprised US$977 billion of local currency
denominated instruments and US$202 billion of U.S. dollar-denominated instruments.
Id. at 9.
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sales, but loans remained the dominant form of debt throughout
the 1980s. '" The succession of Brady-style restructurings in the
early 1990s saw many of these loans converted into Brady bonds:
Typically thirty-year bonds with their principal and twelve to
eighteen months of interest payments collateralized by U.S.
Treasury zero-coupon bonds. 182 Trading in Brady bonds in 1994
was up by 65% over 1993 and nearly seven times the turnover of
loans.1 8 3 The secondary market was, in essence now, a bond
market, with Bradys representing 61% of market turnover. The
transformation of what had begun as a loan market was by 1994
effectively complete, with loans representing only 31% of turno-
ver in 1999.
In early 1996 an enduring anomaly was removed, as the rat-
ings agencies removed the ratings distinction between a nation's
Brady bonds and Eurobonds. Eurobonds were newly issued
bonds that did not arise from a restructuring of earlier indebted-
ness. Formerly, the agencies had rated Brady bonds one half a
grade lower than Eurobonds, arguing that debtors may turn to
the holders of Brady bonds for relief in times of trouble more
readily than to Eurobond holders as Bradys were the by-product
of the bank loans of the 1980s. However, this prospect was de-
termined to have diminished with the substantial sales of Brady
bonds in the secondary market. 84 This begs the question why
the yields of Bradys and Eurobonds did not also equalize, but
they did not.
For a while the gap between the yield on newly issued bonds
and the stripped yield on Brady bonds did narrow dramatically,
from some 470 basis points in early 1996 to around seventy basis
points in January 1998 1 5-partly on the back of a wave of cross-
181. See generally Buckley, Transformative Potential, supra note 1.
182. See generally Buckley, Turning Loans into Bonds, supra note 4 (analyzing the
Brady plan in detail).
183. See EMTA, Bulletin, 3rd Quarter 1995, http://www.emta.org/bulletin/3qtr95.
pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2007); Press Release, Emerging Markets Traders Association,
Emerging Markets Traders Association Survey: Trading Volume in Emerging Markets
Debt Instruments Nears Record U.S.$ 2.8 Trillion in 1994 (May 8, 1995).
184. Alison Warner, Investment Banking: Poles Ahead-High Ratings for Polish Bradys
Confirm the Recovery of the Sovereign Debt Market, BANKER, Mar. 1996, at 18.
185. In January 1998, the Mexican global bond due 2026 offered a yield of 9.51%,
while Mexican Brady par bonds due 2019 provided a stripped yield of 10.2%. Likewise,
the Brazilian global bond due 2027, had a yield of 10.97% and its par bond, due three
years earlier, a yield of 11.47%. See Lucia Reboucas, Investors Prefer Global Foreign Debt
Bonds, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Jan. 9, 1998, front page.
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over investment by investors who had concluded that the risk on
the two types of assets was essentially the same. 186 The gap soon
widened again, however, and by early July 1999 was around 420
basis points for the major debtors. 1 7
Some argue these yield differences reflect a real credit dis-
tinction, i.e., that in troubled times debtors will honor their
newly issued bonds more readily than their Brady bonds. This
may have been true when the stock of global and Eurobonds was
so small that default on a nation's Bradys and continued servic-
ing of its global and Eurobonds was a real possibility, just as most
debtors did not reschedule their bonds in the 1980s because the
stock of bonds was so small relative to loans. However, today the
majority of bond debt of most of the major debtors is in the form
of newly issued bonds, not Bradys, so defaulting on the latter
while servicing the former would make no economic sense.' 88
There are several potential reasons for this discrepancy in
yields.189 First, stripping out the collateral, while easy to do on
paper, is complex and difficult in practice; and investors there-
fore are usually earning the blended yield, which is lower than
the yield on the global and Eurobonds (because the yield on the
collateral in the Bradys-U.S. Treasury zero coupon bonds-is
very low). Second, Brady bonds exhibit more secondary market
volatility than global and Eurobonds and so need to offer a
higher return to investors. Finally, Bradys tend to trade poorly
in hard times as no bank is as committed to making two-way mar-
kets in them in the way that the arrangers of the global and
Eurobonds are committed to these issues.
With hindsight, 1994 represented the pinnacle for Brady
186. See Melvyn Westlake, Storming Morgan, 4 EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Mar.
1997, at 21 [hereinafter Westlake, Storming Morgan].
187. At close of business on July 9, the stripped yield on Argentine par bonds due
2023 was 17.82%, compared to 13.76% for its bonds due 2027; Brazil's par bonds due
2024 were yielding 18.65% on a stripped basis relative to 14.18% for its bonds due 2027,
and Mexico's pars due 2019 were yielding 14.51% as against 10.41% for its bonds due
2026. See E-mail from Michael Pettis to Ross P. Buckley (july 12, 1999) (on file with
author).
188. The presence of the rolling interest guarantee gives debtors a twelve to eigh-
teen month breathing space and may make default a little more likely, as default might
be seen as a way of accessing the value tied up in the collateral supporting that guaran-
tee. However, this factor has not been cited as a cause of the yield differentials and it
could hardly account for significant differentials.
189. See E-mail from Michael Pettis to Ross P. Buckley (July 12, 1999) (on file with
author).
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bonds in this market. From accounting for 61% of turnover in
1994, the relative share of Brady bonds declined to 58% in 1995,
51% in 1996, 41% in 1997, 37% in 1998, and 31% in 1999, and
by 2004 the proportion of turnover Brady bonds represented
had fallen further to 6%.190
In each year from 1994 to 1999, Brazil's was the most com-
monly traded debt, although by 1999 Mexico's debt was also
highly traded.' 9 ' Brazilian debt accounted for 30% of turnover
in 1997. In 1997 Argentine and Mexican assets filled the second
and third spots with 21% and 17% of turnover, respectively.
Fourth place went to Russian debt in 1997, displacing Venezue-
lan debt from 1996. The year 1998 saw Russian debt climb even
further to second place with nearly 29% of turnover. 19 2 This
capped five years of tremendous growth in Russian debt trading
as Russian loans had represented only 1.25% of turnover in
1993. In 1999, the wheel turned full circle, and Russian debt fell
dramatically to represent only 5% of turnover.' 93
As can be seen, trading was concentrated in the debt of a
small number of debtors throughout this period. Trading in the
debt of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela repre-
sented over 90% of turnover in 1996, 85% in 1997, and 81% in
1998. Asian assets represented only 3% of turnover in 1996, 2%
in 1997, and 4% in 1998 (although EMTA notes that, for a vari-
ety of reasons, Asian trading is under-represented in its surveys).
Substantial increases in turnover came in local instruments
in this period. The external trading of local instruments ac-
counted for 19% of turnover in 1994 and rose steadily to 28% in
1998 and 33% in the first quarter of 1999. Local-currency de-
nominated instruments outnumbered U.S. dollar-denominated
instruments by five to one in 1997 and by seven to one in 1998.
190. See Press Release, Emerging Markets Traders Association, EMTA Announces
2004 Annual Emerging Markets Debt Reading Rises to US$4.645 Trillion (2004),
http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/Press-Release-4Q.2004-Survey.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2006).
191. See, e.g., EMTA, Bulletin, 1st Quarter 2000, http://www.emta.org/bulletin/1
qtr0O.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
192. However, in the fourth quarter of 1998, trading in Russian debt represented
only 10% of total turnover, as its economic turmoil struck the market. See EMTA, Bulle-
tin, 2nd Quarter 1999, 1998 Annual Trading Volume Amounted to Nearly US $4.2 Trillion,
at 5. The third and fourth spots in 1998 went to Mexican and Argentine debt, respec-
tively. See id. at 6.
193. See EMTA, Debt Trading Volume Survey First Quarter 2000, No. 1, at 9.
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The importance of local instruments is exemplified by the fact
that, in 1998, trading in one local instrument, Mexican Cetes, at
US$164 billion, far surpassed trading in all of Mexico's Brady
bonds, at US$96 billion. 194
Another area of dramatic increase in this period was non-
Brady bond trading, reflecting the dramatic increase in new is-
sues in 1996 and 1997. These bonds, principally Eurobonds and
global bonds, accounted for 29% of turnover in 1999, up from
24% of turnover in 1998, 11% in 1996, and 8% in 1995.19'
The downturn in 1998 can be attributed to the meltdown in
the Russian economy in August of that year and the continued
uncertainty as to whether Brazil's economy would be pulled into
the maelstrom of the Asian and Russian economic crises.
The best way to appreciate the relative turnover of the vari-
ous emerging markets instruments is graphically, as illustrated
in:













194. See EMTA, 1998 Suruey, supra note 173, at 26.
195. Indeed, in September 1997 when non-Brady bonds represented about one-
half of the trading turnover of Brady bonds, the total outstanding of Brady and non-
Brady bonds were about equal at US$130-140 billion each. See EMTA, 2000 Annual Re-
port (2000), http://www.emta.org/ar2000/ar00.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
196. See EMTA, 1998 Survey, supra note 173, Supplementary Analysis, at 8.
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1. Derivatives Trading
Before 1993, pricing an option in this market was princi-
pally a matter of ascertaining the level at which the seller was
prepared to sell the debt 19 7 and while pricing strategies in-
creased dramatically in sophistication, derivatives continued to
be used, in the main, by investors wishing to place a directional
bet on the market."' 8 Using options for this purpose became
expensive in 1994 and 1995, as the cost of derivatives to investors
is determined by the volatility of the underlying instrument, and
the market shocks of 1994 and 1995 caused sharp rises in volatil-
ity.1"' The increases in the cost of options caused investors to
begin to use spread plays such as a bull spread, which is the
purchase of a call at one strike price and the sale of a call at a
higher strike price to achieve some of the purposes of a straight
option for less cost.2 °°
The range of debt upon which derivatives could be acquired
expanded in this period to embrace Venezuela, Poland, Mo-
rocco, Nigeria, Russia, Ecuador, and Peru as well as the major
debtors. 20  Nonetheless, the derivatives on offer remained sim-
ple relative to the sophistication of more mature markets with
options and warrants dominating the market.
The market in derivatives on the currencies of these debtors
was far more sophisticated and developed. In 1995, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange ("CME") launched trading in Mexican
peso futures and options and created a new division, the Growth
and Emerging Markets Division, initially to trade futures and op-
tions on Emerging Markets' currencies, equities, interest rates,
and stock market indices. 20 2
197. See Andrew Wheelan, Emerging Market Derivatives-No Longer Emerging, INT'L
FIN. REv., Sept. 24, 1994.
198. See William Nightingale, Jack of All Trades; The Many Uses of Derivatives in the
Emerging Markets, LATINFINANCE, Nov. 1994, at S12; see also Isaac Barrocas & Rick Beston,
The Ups and Downs of Latin Bradys: Option Strategies That Worked, LATINFINANCE, Jan.
1996, at D22.
199. See Weeks, supra note 4, at 26.
200. See Nightingale, supra note 198, at S12.
201. See Wheelan, supra note 197; see also 1 World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1994-
1995, at 32.
202. See George Gunsett, Merc Reaches for Fresh Terrain; "Emerging Markets" Division
Proposed, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1995, at 1; Merc Expands; Expanding Markets Division Gets
OK, CHI. TRmB., Nov. 3, 1995, at 3; William Smith, Merc Forming New Division, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at 43.
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Derivatives specific to this market include those designed to
strip out the zero coupon bond component of Brady bonds and
sell the pure risk to investors. This was typically achieved by go-
ing short on the zero but was difficult to do for most Brady
bonds because the zero coupon bonds, issued specifically by the
U.S. Treasury for the purpose, contained covenants designed to
prevent this. Such derivatives were easy to structure for Brazilian
Bradys, the zero coupon bonds which Brazil had bought on the
open market, 20 3 and derivatives specialists, found ways to do it
for the Bradys of Nigeria and Bulgaria, among others.2 °4
In Chicago, the CME, and the Chicago Board of Trade
("CBoT") actively developed their emerging markets derivatives
business. The CME offered futures on, among other things, in-
dividual types of Brady bonds and emerging markets currencies,
and the CBoT offered futures and options on a Brady Bond in-
dex and various local stock market indices. Such derivatives
trading is also conducted on exchanges in the emerging market
nations, particularly Brazil and Mexico.
Evidence suggests that the availability and use of derivatives
may have exacerbated the Asian and Russian crises. In Asia,
swaps were popular in which banks paid the return on U.S. in-
struments and received the return on domestic instruments.
These swaps were off-balance-sheet transactions that could be
funded on limited margins. The swaps were very profitable for
as long as the relevant exchange rate held firm and resulted in
huge losses once the local currencies depreciated dramati-
cally. 205
In Russia, the debt moratorium resulted in massive losses
for foreign and local users of over-the-counter derivatives-losses
which were as high as US$90 billion on some estimates.20 6 The
attractiveness of Russian state short-term obligations ("GKOs")
to investors was enhanced by the use of forward contracts to
hedge the investors' ruble exposures. However, forward cur-
rency hedges do not protect against debt moratoria. In the
203. See generally Buckley, Turning Loans into Bonds, supra note 182.
204. See Rick Beston, New Investors, New Products; Derivatives Trading in Latin
America, LATINFiNANCE, Nov. 1996, at 62; see also Ronit Ghose, Right Tools for the Job,
EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Sept. 1997, at CR9; Tom Groefeldt, A Credit to Themselves,
EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Sept. 1997, at CR4.
205. 1 World Bank, Global Development Finance 1999, at 39-40 (1999).
206. See id. at 39.
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World Bank's words: "It is unlikely that investors would have as-
sumed the same level of exposure to GKOs if derivatives had not
been available. 2 °7
C. Other Characteristics
Other characteristics of the market in this period were: (i)
extreme volatility; (ii) equity-like characteristics; and (iii) a high
degree of correlation between geographic regions. The volatility
came from the long term of the Brady bonds and the political
and economic uncertainty in the debtor nations. It was ensured
by the short-term investment horizon of the principal types of
investors in Brady bonds: Trading houses taking large positions,
highly leveraged hedge and Latin capital-flight funds and open-
ended mutual funds concerned about redemptions." 8 The eq-
uity-like nature of these debt instruments and the correlation be-
tween regions takes a little more explaining.
1. The Equity-like Nature of Emerging Markets Debt
Two pieces of research highlighted the equity-like nature of
emerging markets debt in this period. The first was by Gary Ev-
ans and Jose Cerritelli,2 °9 and the second by Michael Pettis and
Jared Gross.2 1 ° Each argued that Brady bonds and emerging
markets loans more often behave like equities than like tradi-
tional debt instruments. The preconditions for this behaviour
were laid by the institutional structure of the market, the large
issue size, long maturity, and high liquidity of Brady bonds, and
the political and economic uncertainty of the debtor nations.21 '
Market behavior certainly supports this thesis: Investors in
emerging markets debt in bull runs received equity-like returns
well in excess of equities in developed nations and often in ex-
cess of emerging markets equities; 212 the volatility of emerging
markets debt, particularly upon developments in the debtor's
economy, resembled that of equity rather than debt; and inves-
tors used Brady bonds "as a macroeconomic equity play" on the
207. See id.
208. See Muehring, supra note 62, at 127.
209. See Emerging Market Debt-LDC Debt Is Equity, INT'L FIN. REV., Nov. 26, 1994.
210. See Michael Pettis &Jared Gross, What Does It Mean to Say That Debt Has Equity-
like Returns? The Delta of Low Quality Debt, CAP. MARKETS STRATEGIES, June 1995.
211. See Gary Evans, Identity Crisis, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Feb. 1995, at 45.
212. See id.; see Emerging Market Debt-LDC Debt Is Equity, supra note 209.
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debtor nations, 21 3 i.e., investors wishing to express a view on a
nation's prospects did so by buying or selling Brady bonds.2 1 4
2. Correlation between Regions
The degree of correlation between various emerging equity
markets was historically thought to be low. As Kenneth King and
Paul Cox wrote in 1995: "[A] familiar argument for investing in
the 24 or so emerging markets has been that they are basically
uncorrelated with each other, and so have comparatively low vol-
atility as a global portfolio. '215 In their article, King and Cox
challenged this assumption for equities and proved correlation
was increasing within regions such as Asia or Latin America, and
even between regions.216
Whatever may have been the historical position in equity
markets, 217 emerging markets debt has always been highly corre-
lated both within and between regions. In 1995, most investors
viewed all of Latin America as a single market, and many viewed
the entire emerging markets as one,21' as the tequila effect estab-
lished conclusively 2 9 and the contagion which followed the eco-
nomic crises in Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998 confirmed. The
1997 contagion was less severe than in 1995, which suggested a
maturation in the market that the contagion from Russia's crisis
was to deny.
213. Emerging Market Debt-LDC Debt Is Equity, supra note 209.
214. See Muehring, supra note 62, at 45 ("Bradys are the vehicle through which you
express a view on the emerging markets. Because they are so large and liquid, they've
become the best proxy for hedging positions in other markets, such as Latin Eurobonds
.... "). According to Michael Pettis, Bradys can be an accurate proxy in local equity
markets as well. See E-mail from Michael Pettis, supra note 189 (stating "investors see
Brady bonds as alternative and equivalent to local stock markets").
215. Kenneth King & Paul Cox, Too Close for Comfort, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,
Mar. 1995, at 44.
216. See id. at 44.
217. The assertion that equity markets have been lowly correlated strikes this au-
thor as strange given the apparent correlation between equity and debt emerging mar-
kets and the experience in the debt markets; but as this work has not focused on equity
markets, it does not disprove this proposition.
218. See Scuppered-The Pipeline Is Bursting with Latin American ADR Issues, INT'L FIN.
REv., Jan. 7, 1995.
219. When currency problems in Mexico cause a run on the Thai baht and stock
exchange prices to fall in India, Indonesia, Hungary, and Poland, one knows that eco-
nomic fundamentals are playing a minor role in investors' decisions.
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D. Impetus for the Market
Much light can be shed upon the market by considering the
factors that have driven it. The principal factors driving the mar-
ket in this period were: (i) the increasing role of crossover inves-
tors, caused principally by the low yields available in developed
countries coupled to stronger economic fundamentals in many
emerging nations; (ii) the strong growth in new issues; (iii) the
buy-backs of Brady bonds; and (iv) the tremendous increase in
foreign investment in local instruments. In addition to these fac-
tors, the new Brady-style restructurings provided substantial im-
petus to the market early in the period.2 2 ° Each factor will be
considered.
1. The Central Role of Crossover Investors
Crossover is the market's term for mainstream institutional
investors adding emerging market bonds to their portfolios for
higher yield. These investors include pension funds, insurance
companies, high-yield ('junk") bond mutual funds, high-grade
bond funds, international bond funds, and hedge funds.2"'
These funds control such vast amounts of capital that 5% of
their aggregate portfolios far exceeds the capitalization of the
specialist emerging markets funds, and many allocate that pro-
portion to the emerging markets. 222 The crossover phenome-
non is, in essence, the story of a broad array of money managers
becoming comfortable with higher risk investments and learning
220. A potential further factor is the increase in creditworthiness of some debtor
nations. As the credit rating of a debtor improved, so the range of potential investors in
its debt increased. In particular, an investment grade rating was especially significant,
as a number of insurance companies and pension funds are proscribed by their constit-
uent documents or State regulations from investing in below investment-grade assets.
Poland received an investment grade rating from one of the two major credit rating
agencies in 1994, and Colombia's debt was rated as being of investment grade in Sep-
tember 1995. These improvements in creditworthiness provided some slight impetus to
trading in the secondary market. See Emerging Market Debt-Oversupply Worries, INr'L FIN.
REv., June 3, 1995; Mullin, Tequila Hangover, supra note 30; David Scanlan, Colombia to
Obtain $225 Million Loan from Group of Banks, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Oct. 9, 1995,
at 8D.
221. See Peter Eavis, The Crossover Factor, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, May 1997, at
17; Emerging Markets Trends: Stellar Fixed-Income Returns-Czech Koruna, INT'L FIN. REV.,
Jan. 25, 1997.
222. For instance, the 182 SEC-registered high yield funds tracked by Lipper Ana-
lytical have about US$70 billion in assets, compared to the US$2 billion in assets of the
twenty-one SEC-registered emerging markets bond funds. See Eavis, supra note 221, at
17.
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to leaven their portfolios with a small proportion of higher risk
assets in the quest for a higher overall return.2 23
The unprecedented inflows to mutual funds in the early-to-
mid-1990s shrivelled fixed income yields in the developed coun-
tries. Crossover investors moved further afield in search of
higher yields. 224 They began to invest substantially in emerging
markets bonds in the bull run of 1993, but fled the market when
the bears growled in 1994 and 1995. They returned in far
greater numbers in the bull run of 1996 and provided much of
the impetus for the dramatic 39% increase in debt prices that
year.225 The returns were certainly there: in the first eight
months of 1996, U.S. Treasuries returned negative 2.8%; U.S.
corporate bonds, 0.6%; U.S. junk bonds, 6.3%; and emerging
markets bonds, 15.7%.
Crossover investors also acquired much of the record $90
billion of new bond issues that year; indeed, as 1996 progressed,
more and more underwriters began to sell new emerging mar-
kets issues from their high yield or high grade desks rather than
from emerging markets desks, in recognition of the destination
of the majority of the bonds.2 2 6
The flood of crossover investment caused the yields on the
traditional emerging market instruments, Brady and euro bonds,
to fall sharply. The emerging market money that had brought
these bonds to prominence moved on in search of higher yield,
this time to local instruments-bonds denominated in either
dollars or local currency that are issued in the local market as
opposed to internationally. 227 Local instruments developed into
a major secondary market sector over this period.
By 1997, many crossover investors had come to depend on
the emerging markets to maintain above-average returns. The
initial test of their commitment to the markets came in April
1997 as U.S. short-term interest rates began to climb. The pros-
223. See Keith Mullin, Yield: The Opium of Global Investors, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 13,
1997.
224. See Crossing the Line, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 21, 1996.
225. See Eavis, supra note 221, at 16.
226. See Latin America Regional Report-Investment Flows-Crossing Over Takes Hold,
INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 8, 1997. For instance, 85% of the US$700 million bond issue by
Grupo Televisa, a Mexican media company, in May 1996 was sold to crossover investors.
See Eavis, supra note 221.
227. See Tidal Wave of Foreign Finance, INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 21, 1996.
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pect of a mass withdrawal by crossover investors, as in 1994, led
to a decidedly jittery market. Crossover investors are tradition-
ally strong on analysis of the issuers' business and balance sheet
and less so on analysis of country risk. However, in 1997, they
displayed maturity and understanding of the market by not with-
drawing en masse. 221 Indeed, crossover investors underpinned
the market until late 1997, as pension funds and insurance com-
panies began to allocate from 3% to 6% of their portfolios to the
emerging markets, following the lead of the mutual funds which
often were more heavily committed to emerging markets. 22 9
With their perceived higher creditworthiness, East Asian
and Eastern European issuers appealed in particular to crossover
investors. 230 Indeed, the flow of capital allowed yields to decline
so dramatically that new issues by these issuers at around 100
basis points over U.S. Treasuries became common, and Slovenia
was able to issue a US$325 million five-year Eurobond at only
fifty-eight basis points over U.S. Treasuries231 in an issue sold
principally to mainstream institutional investors. Likewise, Indo-
nesia was able to issue US$400 million in ten-year Yankee bonds
priced at 100 basis points over Treasuries. 232 As subsequent
events confirmed, investors were severely underestimating the
country risk. 3
Crossover investors brought the emerging markets into the
investment mainstream. The most remarkable change in this pe-
riod is that the secondary market moved from a specialist niche
market to one that was simply one sector, albeit a risky sector, of
the mainstream market.234 This was borne out by the behavior
of the crossover investors in the depths of the October 1997 sell-
off. While many left the market, many more stayed. Crossover
investors displayed far more commitment to the sector than, for
228. See Merrill Lynch, Emerging Markets Debt Monthly, Dec. 16, 1997, at 7.
229. See Danielle Robinson, Crunch Time for Emerging Markets, EUROWEEK, Jan. 1998,
at 240.
230. See Back with a Vengeance, INT'L FIN. REv., Sept. 21, 1996.
231. See Keith Mullin, A Stunning Debut, INT'L FIN. REV., Dec. 21, 1996.
232. See Sovereign Bond Deal of the Year, ASIAMONEY, Feb. 1997, at 38.
233. See Tidal wave of Foreign Finance, supra note 227. For instance, the Czech Ex-
port Bank was able to obtain a three-year US$150 million revolving credit syndicated
loan priced at a mere 12.5 basis points over LIBOR. See id.
234. See EMTA, 1996 Annual Report 1 (1996), http://www.emta.org/about/emta96
ar.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
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instance, hedge funds.235
In 1998, crossover investors were again consistent buyers of
the new issues. 2 3 6 However, not even the new-found commit-
ment of the crossover investors could withstand the contagion
from the Russian crisis. Having suffered egregious losses, many
withdrew from participation in the market. One factor under-
mining the commitment of crossover investors to the market was
that the majority of institutional investors did not benchmark
their emerging markets bonds against an index as they would
have with investment grade bonds.2 37
2. The Dramatic Growth in New Issues
While this research does not deal in depth with new issues-
neither Eurobonds, yankee, samurai, nor dragon bonds238 -the
influence of the new issues on the market in this period is too
large to ignore entirely. Yen and Deutsche mark denominated
bond issues were the saviors of Latin American and Eastern Eu-
ropean sovereigns in 1995 when nearly one-half of all emerging
markets debt issues were denominated in one of those curren-
cies. 23 9 Yields on Deutsche mark and yen bonds were very low,
and non-investment grade paper was rare in these markets. This
allowed Latin American borrowers to raise massive amounts of
funds at relatively fine prices.24 °
235. See Making Sense of a Meltdown, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Nov. 1997, at 4;
see also Merrill Lynch, Emerging Markets Debt Monthly, Dec. 16, 1997, at 7.
236. See Keith Mullin, Sovereigns Lead New-Issue Renaissance, INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 25,
1998.
237. As do dedicated emerging markets funds.
238. While samurai bonds were far less significant than euroyen issues, a remarka-
ble 50% of all samurai bond issurances in 1995 were by emerging markets issuers. The
secondary market in new issue bonds is not as liquid as Brady bonds because many
investors buy Eurobonds to hold until maturity. See Paul Kilby, Growing Pains: Debt Mar-
ket Survives Bumps and Bruises on Its Way to Maturity, LATINFINANCE, Mar. 1995, at 60;
Secondary Market-Open Season, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 4, 1994; see also Christopher Mai-
lander, Financial Innovation, Domestic Regulation and the International Marketplace: Lessons
on Meeting Globalization's Challenge Drawn from the International Bond Market, 31 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 341, 342-43 (1998) (describing these bonds).
239. See Latin Issuers Back in Contention, INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 16, 1996; see also Ali-
son Warner, Poles Ahead, BANKER, Mar. 1996, at 18.
240. In particular, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico tapped the yen market, with Uru-
guay, Colombia, and Venezuela joining them in issuing in Deutsche marks. See Mullin,
Tequila Hangover, supra note 30. For instance, Mexico was able to issue 100 billion yen
in bonds at a spread of nearly 200 basis points. See Investors Step Back into The Arena,
INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 30, 1995.
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With the bull run of 1996, the issuers returned to the U.S.
dollar, with 69% of bonds dollar-denominated,24 and to issuing
record amounts: over US$90 billion of bonds issued compared
to US$56 billion in 1995.242 The largest issuers were Mexico,
with US$17.8 billion of bonds issued; South Korea, US$14.9 bil-
lion; Argentina, US$11.7 billion; Brazil, US$9.1 billion; and In-
donesia, US$4.8 billion.243 Through 1996 and up to October
1997, tenors increased significantly and spreads narrowed dra-
matically.244
Mexico's return to the voluntary capital markets on this
scale signalled an astonishing rehabilitation from the peso crisis
and tequila effect. Mexico's officials received effusive and uni-
versal praise in the international capital markets for engineering
Mexico's return to pre-eminence among emerging markets bor-
rowers. 245 As Tulio Vera said in mid-1996: "That an issuer,
which less than a year and a half ago could conceivably default,
can now go out and raise a 30-year bond is incredible. 246
There were a number of notable issues in 1996. Foremost
among them was Mexico's massive US$6 billion debt issue in
July, which was used to repay the relatively expensive loans ad-
vanced by the U.S. Treasury as part of the U.S.-led bailout of
Mexico in 1995.247 JPMorgan managed the issue and creatively
supported its credit with future Mexican oil revenues and by
structuring it as a hybrid transaction in which purchasers could
acquire either floating rate notes or certificated bank notes. The
issue thus appealed to both bond investors and commercial
banks.248 Mexico had laid the groundwork for this issue with an
241. See International Bond Issuance: A Banner Year, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,
Jan. 1997, at 3 (whereas only 58% of bonds were dollar-denominated in 1995).
242. See Prospect '97, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Jan. 1997, at 14; see also Interna-
tional Bond Issuance: A Banner Year, supra note 241, at 3; cf 1 World Bank, Development
Finance 1997, supra note 66, at 105 (showing slightly lower figures).
243. See International Bond Issuance: A Banner Year, supra note 241, at 3.
244. See Danielle Robinson, Crunch Time for Emerging Markets, EUROWEEK, Jan. 1997,
at 240 (showing average weighted maturities of emerging markets bonds lengthening to
11.5 years (from 4.5 years in 1995)).
245. See Danielle Robinson, Mexico Repays Market's Faith, EUROWEEK, Mar. 14, 1997,
at LA26.
246. Brian Caplan, Best Emerging Markets Borrowers: Mexico, EUROMONEY, June 1996,
at 64.
247. See David E. Sanger, Mexico Says It Will Repay $7 Billion to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1996, at Dl, C5.
248. See Best Deals of '96: Mexico's Maxi, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Jan. 1997, at
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innovative US$1.5 billion issue in November 1995 which yielded
the higher of twelve month dollar LIBOR or twenty-eight day
Cetes yields minus 6% (Cetes are local market peso-denomi-
nated paper). This allowed investors to take a punt on receiving
high returns while minimizing risk for those funding in LI-
BOR.2 49
In 1997 notable issues included Argentina's issue of ten-year
Eurobonds denominated in pesos. Priced at only 160 basis
points over Argentina's dollar-denominated Eurobonds and is-
sued in an amount of 500 million pesos, the issue confirmed the
market's faith in Argentina's fixed peg of the peso to the U.S.
dollar,2 5' a faith that was to prove utterly misplaced. 25' The flu-
idity of these markets was well demonstrated by Mexico-it
made a number of bond issues in the first half of the year in yen,
lira, pounds sterling, and dollars. In August 1997, Mexico used
the proceeds to prepay the US$6 billion 1996 issue, thereby
lengthening its debt maturity profile, securing lower interest
rates, and freeing up the oil revenue collateral attached to the
earlier bond.2 5 2
The year 1997 was also notable for the regular issuances by
Latin American issuers in a broad range of European currencies
and for regular global bond issuances of US$1 billion and
upwards, designed to ensure the liquidity that had often been
lacking in the new issue market.253
The dramatic growth in new issues of 1996 was sustained
through the setbacks of 1997, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve's
increase in interest rates in the first quarter and the onset of East
Asia's troubles in June. 254 The primary market displayed a depth
and stability not seen before. The debtor nations, with Brady
bond exchanges, global bonds, local debt programs, and in-
21; Michael Tangeman, Mexico Gets the Timing Right, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1997,
at 116.
249. See A Watershed Deal, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Feb. 1996, at 42.
250. See Vote of Confidence, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Mar. 1997, at 13; see also
Danielle Robinson, New World for Latin Sovereign Debt, EUROWEEK, Aug. 29, 1997, at 48
(commenting that by June 1997, when Argentina issued five-year europeso bond,
spread had halved to around 80 basis points).
251. See Ross Buckley, Do Cry for the Argentines: An Analysis of Their Crisis, 17 BANK.
& FIN. L. REV. 373, 374-75 (2003).
252. See Prepayment Potpourri, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, July/Aug. 1997, at 11.
253. See Robinson, supra note 250, at 48.
254. Cf Emerging Market Debt: Has the Party Ended?, INT'L FIN. REV., May 3, 1997.
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creased European currency issuance, likewise displayed a more
sophisticated and flexible approach to liability management
than in earlier years. 25 The growth in new issues in this period
was supported by the improving economic outlook and liability
management of debtor nations, and driven by the low rates of
return on investments in industrial countries, the increased li-
quidity in international capital markets, and the increasing toler-
ance of risk displayed by traditionally conservative institutional
investors.256
October 1997 changed all this: The demand for emerging
markets debt largely evaporated; fortunately, most emerging
markets borrowers had already raised all the capital they needed
for the year. The demand for dollar-denominated debt was the
slowest in returning. For instance, in the first two months of
1998, Argentina raised the equivalent of US$1.35 billion in the
Deutsche Mark, Euro/ECU, French franc, guilder, and lira mar-
kets, and only US$500 million.257 In early 1998, the Latin sover-
eigns principally raised capital in a host of European curren-
cies, 258 and Latin blue-chip corporates and major banks issued
short-term dollar denominated paper.259
Notwithstanding its very real economic problems, Korea's
US$4 billion global bond issue in early April 1998 was three-
times oversubscribed. The IMF's record US$57 billion bailout
was in place, but such strong appetite for bonds yielding only
around 350 basis points over comparable U.S. Treasuries was dif-
ficult to fathom.26 °
Russia's crisis in August closed the market to new issues for
a while, and recovery, when it came, was slow. Indeed, twenty-
three debt deals were completed in the primary market in No-
vember and the first half of December 1998, compared to sixty-
255. See Robinson, supra note 250, at 48.
256. See I World Bank, Development Finance 1997, supra note 66, at 107.
257. See Prime Corporates Left Out in the Cold, INT'L FIN. REV. LATIN AMERICA RE-
GIONAL REPORT, Mar. 7, 1998, at 8.
258. See Sovereigns Lead New-Issue Renaissance, INT'L FIN. REV., Apr. 25, 1998 (indi-
cating that emerging markets sovereigns, principally Latin American, issued some $12
billion of bonds in first quarter of 1998).
259. See Keeping It Short, INT'L FIN. REv., Jan. 24, 1998, at 88.
260. The bonds went 70% to the U.S., 20% to Europe, and 10% to Asia. See Relief
Over Korea, INT'L FIN. REv., Apr. 11, 1998; see also Buyers Rush Korean Bond Issue, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Apr. 10, 1998, at 21; Kenneth Gilpin, The Markets: Bonds; Investors
Snap Up Korea Bonds In a Big Vote of Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1998, at D1.
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five in the same period in 1997.261 In the aftermath of Russia,
most investors required extra inducements to buy bonds. For
example, Argentina was able to raise US$1 billion in November
1998 by issuing bonds with warrants that permitted holders to
buy Argentina's global bond due 2027 in one year's time, at a
fixed price.2 6 2 In addition to warrants, the other popular in-
ducement was, predictably, the securitization of assets such as oil
and telecom revenues. The trend to sweeteners continued well
into 1999. In February 1999, Mexico's US$1 billion bond issue
included warrants entitling the exchange of Brady bonds into
new global bonds in one year.2 63 Similarly, Argentina's 1999 is-
sue included warrants entitling the purchase of more of the
same bonds in one year's time.26 4 Inducements were also neces-
sary in 1999 for debt of maturities of five years and longer.265
The development with the most potential future impact
during this period was the trend towards issuance in emerging
market currencies by corporations, sovereigns, and suprana-
tional institutions. 266 The supranationals followed this route for
two reasons: (1) very fine pricing was achievable in these curren-
cies in this period; and (2) to develop Euromarkets for curren-
cies such as the Czech and Slovak korunas, the Korean won, the
Mexican peso, the New Taiwan dollar, the Philippine peso, the
Polish zloty, and the South African rand.2 67 The supranationals
issued the equivalent of US$4 billion in emerging markets cur-
261. See Kiss of Life, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Jan. 1999, at 10.
262. The price of the bond was US$93.3. SeeJonathon Fuerbringer, Argentina Sells
$1 Billion of 20-Year Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at Cl1. The bond was trading at
US$85.5 when the warrants were issued and at around eighty-four U.S. dollars in Febru-
ary 1999. Id. at ClI.
263. See Global Bonds Contain Warrants, INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 6, 1999, at 68; see also
Jeremy Weintraub, LatAm Sovereigns Seize Moment of Stability, INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 6,
1999, at 63.
264. See Jonathon Fuerbringer, Argentina Sells $1 Billion of 20-Year Bonds, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at CIl; Jeremy Weintraub, Latin Bond Markets Breathe New Life,
INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 20, 1999, at 59.
265. See Jeremy Weintraub, Phoney Yield Curve Masks Sovereign Funding Costs, INT'L
FIN. REV., Mar. 13, 1999, at 52.
266. See Piers Townsend, !FR 250-Supranationals Buoy Emerging Currencies/Suprana-
tional Borrowing, INT'L FIN. REv., July 18, 1998 (noting World Bank, European Invest-
ment Bank, International Finance Corporation and European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development all issued debt in emerging market currencies).
267. While the range of new currencies was impressive, the depth of issuance was
not yet there-three-fourths of the volume of new bonds issued in 1997 were denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars. See 1 World Bank, Development Finance 1998, supra note 82.
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rencies in the first nine months of 1997, four times the figure for
the whole of 1996 and nearly eight times the amount issued in
1995.268
The trend towards local currency issuance in the Euro-
market was significant, because it offered the best way to shift the
exchange rate liability from debtors onto foreign investors, and
thus minimize the prospects of, and the pain suffered by the
debtors and creditors, any future sovereign debt crisis.26" When
emerging markets debtors borrow in their own currency and
their economy is healthy, the real cost of such borrowing tends
to be high, as interest rates are generally higher on local cur-
rency debt. When their economy is weak, the real cost of bor-
rowing tends to be low due to a deteriorating exchange rate.
Raising capital in the relevant local currency tends to ensure that
debtors pay handsomely when they can afford to do so, and less
when they cannot. This liability profile displaces or minimizes
the damage to all parties from a debt crisis.27 ° If the day arrives
when a majority of sovereign borrowing by emerging markets
countries is denominated in the currency of the debtor, the in-
ternational financial system will be inherently more stable, as the
risks of raising international debt will be apportioned far more
equitably between creditors and debtors than was the case in
1982, 1995, 1997, or 1998.
The premise underlying the massive loans of the 1970s was
that sovereigns never go bankrupt because they can always raise
taxes: The loans arranged by the economic elite of a nation can
always be repaid by its poor. The poor of Latin America en-
dured seven years of suffering before the developed world began
to embrace the notion of debt relief. Borrowing in local cur-
rency would lead to increased reward for creditors when times
are good, and conversely provide debt relief when times are bad.
3. Debt Buy-backs
Brady Bond exchanges are, of course, a type of buy-back
268. See Charles Olivier, Changing World for the Supras, EUROWEEK, Oct. 1997, at 4;
see also A Widening Search for Arbitrage, EUROWEEK, Oct. 1997, at 11; Peter Temple, Curren-
cies d la Mode, EMERGING Markets Investor, July-Aug. 1997, at 31.
269. See Michael Pettis, The New Dance of the Millions, CHALLENGE: MAG. ECON. AFF.,
July-Aug. 1998, at 90.
270. See id.
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and have been considered above. 27 1 They provided some impe-
tus to the market in this period. Far greater impetus was pro-
vided by informal debt buy-backs, an altogether quieter affair
than exchanges. In an informal buy-back, a sovereign repur-
chases its Brady bonds on the secondary market, typically using
the proceeds of newly issued bonds. These repurchases are
often conducted anonymously through agents, resulting in
scarce information regarding these transactions. The rationale
for the buy-backs is the same as for the exchanges: The total
stock of debt is reduced because the Bradys are repurchased at a
discount and the liberated collateral is used to retire further
debt. The trade-off is that the newly issued bonds are usually
issued at higher interest rates and for shorter terms than the
debt being retired. Of course, the principal has to be repaid
upon maturity and is not covered by zero coupon bonds as with
Bradys.
Depending upon secondary market prices, and prevailing
interest rates, buy-backs can be an extremely attractive proposi-
tion for debtor governments.2 7 2
Brady bonds typically did not prohibit buy-backs and, as
bonds, had none of the sharing, patti passu, and other clauses
typical of sovereign loan agreements, which also require waivers
for buy-backs to proceed.27" Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela
reportedly conducted substantial buy-back programs in 1995.274
Indeed, most debtors bought back a portion of their debt when
prices fell far enough, partly to profit from the large discount
and partly to provide stability for their paper. When Brady bond
prices fell, their yields increased, which meant higher yields had
to be paid to issue new Eurobonds.27 5 Consequently, emerging
markets sovereigns retained a healthy appetite for Eurobonds.
Peru, rather cheekily, bought back substantial amounts of
its debt while engaged in negotiations with its bankers for a
271. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
272. See Paul Kilby, Smoother Sailing? Latin Brady Investment Market, LATINFINANCE,
Sept. 1995, at 34; Michael Marray, Stealthy Buyback, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1995, at 24.
273. See Ross P. Buckley, Debt Exchanges Revisited: Lessons from Latin America for East-
ern Europe, 18 Nw. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 655, 679-80 (1998).
274. See Kilby, supra note 272, at 34.
275. See Weeks, supra note 4, at 26 ("Countries are also learning that they must do
what is necessary to support prices of their [Brady bonds] if they are to remain in a
position to issue other securities on the international markets."); see also Kilby, supra
note 272, at 34.
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Brady-style restructuring. 276 Peru reportedly bought some of its
debt in late 1994 and early 1995 through Swiss Bank Corpora-
tion at prices between forty-two and fifty-two U.S. cents27 7 and a
further US$1.2 billion of its debt in July and August, 1995 for
US$600 million. 278 This was highly beneficial for Peru, as past
due interest was not usually forgiven in Brady deals. Peru was so
far in arrears that past due interest and principal were roughly
equal to around US$4 billion each. 279 However, past due inter-
est ceased to matter upon the repurchase and retirement of
debt, so Peru was twice as well off by repurchasing its debt in the
market than by restructuring it in a Brady-style restructure, even
one with a principal discount as high as 50%.
Later deals included Argentina's repurchase of some of its
Brady bonds with part of the US$1.7 billion from two yen and
Deutsche Mark Eurobond issues in late 1995,280 Mexico's repur-
chase of US$1.2 billion of Brady bonds at eighty-one cents on
the dollar with the proceeds of a US$1 billion twenty-year bond
in September 1996281 and its redemption of US$1 billion of Az-
tec bonds in March 1997,282 and Poland's repurchase of some
US$1.7 billion of Bradys in May 1997. Numerous other nations,
particularly Brazil, took advantage of the low interest rates in the
primary markets to issue new bonds and use the proceeds to re-
purchase Brady bonds quietly in the secondary market. 28 3 These
buy-backs were an important motivator in the market during this
period, even though they diminished the stock of the most liq-
uid instrument in the market.28 4 By late 1997, Brady bonds rep-
resented only 12% of the total stock of emerging market debt,
276. See Marray, supra note 272, at 24.
277. See id.; see also Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market
and Its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAMi L. REV. 2701, 2757-60 (1996).
278. See Kilby, supra note 272, at 34.
279. See Marray, supra note 272, at 24.
280. See id. at 13.
281. The new issue was issued at 445 basis points over U.S. Treasuries. See I World
Bank, Development Finance 1997, supra note 66.
282. This was a great deal for Mexico as the coupon on the Aztecs was substantially
higher than on the debt with which they were replaced and, in addition, some $400
million of collateral was liberated. The bonds were redeemed at par. See Robinson,
supra, note 245, at [A26.
283. See Brazil Sets $5bn Shelf, Prepared Bond/Brady Buyback, EUROWEEK, Mar. 27,
1997, at 4. Brazil, in particular, engaged in extensive informal buy-backs of its bonds.
See Rescheduling Finance Against Poverty, INT'L FIN. REV., Sept. 13, 1997.
284. See Buy Back Stirred Brady Bond Market, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Jan. 5,
1998.
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and yet remained the most actively traded portion of the mar-
ket.285
Informal Brady bond buy-backs continued throughout
1997, until the October market crash stopped the source of
funds-the new issue pipeline. 286  However, while moving one
group of debt repurchasers temporarily aside, the Asian troubles
ushered another group onto center stage. In Asia itself, the
troubled corporations, or their principal shareholders, became
major repurchasers of the corporation's debt. At steep dis-
counts, the repurchase of debt allowed the debtor corporations
to obtain debt forgiveness and continue in business,287 usually by
virtue of capital injections from their controlling shareholders or
through debt buy-backs by shareholders.
As the effects of the Asian crisis contagion wore off in early
1998, the major Latin American nations apparently resumed re-
purchasing their debt.288 Certainly by August and September of
1998 Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela were active in repurchas-
ing their debt, with Argentina repurchasing some US$700 mil-
lion of its Brady par bonds in September alone.28 9
4. Local Instruments
The emerging markets are driven by investors' appetites for
high yields. 29 In 1993 this appetite led investors to debt instru-
ments issued in the debtor country. The most accessible instru-
ments were cetes (peso-denominated Mexican treasury bills),
tesobonos (dollar-denominated Mexican treasury bills), and
bonex (dollar-denominated Argentine treasury bills) .291 By mid-
1994, nearly one-half of all cetes were held by foreigners.292 By
January 1995, foreign ownership had risen to 70% of cetes and
285. See Danielle Robinson, New World for Latin Sovereign Debt, EUROWEEK, Aug. 29,
1997, at 48.
286. See Changing Face of Debt, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Oct. 1997, at 4.
287. See Melvyn Westlake, Asia's NewJunkyard, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Feb.
1998, at 15, 17 [hereinafter Westlake, Junkyard].
288. See Worst Levels Since Early October, INT'L FIN. REV., Jan. 16, 1999, at 91.
289. See Jim Sullivan, Hope Fades from Brady/Global Market, INr'L FIN. REV. LATIN
AMERICA, Nov. 2, 1998, at 16.
290. See Will Goodhart, Getting to Know the Locals, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,
Jan. 1995, at 53.
291. Id.; see also World Bank, World Debt Tables 1994-5 (1995), at 13-14.
292. See Goodhart, supra note 290, at 53.
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82% of tesobonos.293 Indeed, it was the pending maturity of
some US$6 billion of cetes and US$5.2 billion of tesobonos in
late January and early February 1995 that helped trigger the
peso crisis of December 1994, as it became increasingly unlikely
that Mexico would be able to roll most of them over.2 94
It has been suggested that the movement into local currency
bonds was supported by investors seeking debt instruments not
linked to the dollar when U.S. interest rates were in decline. 295
Whatever the cause, the braver institutional investors were soon
investing up to 10% of their portfolios into local instruments.
The local instruments of the major debtors such as Mexico and
Argentina attracted the most attention; however, others, such as
the Polish zloty and Czech koruna instruments, and a growing
range of Asian bonds, also attracted investors.296  The high
yields, particularly of the Latin American instruments, proved at-
tractive to many investors as 1995 progressed.297 These instru-
ments were traded through the secondary market and added sig-
nificantly to market volume. 29" As Table Two establishes, the
secondary market was serving as the intermediary facilitating the
flow of developed world capital to developing nations.
299
293. See Latin America in the Fallout Zone, ECONOMIST (UK), Jan. 7, 1995, at 59.
294. See id.; Thomas T. Vogel, More Pain Seen for Emerging-Market Bond Buyers, OR-
ANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 23, 1995, at D23.
295. See Goodhart, supra note 290, at 52.
296. See id.; Ernie McCrary, The Blossoming of Asia Bonds, EMERGING MARKETS INVES-
TOR, Nov. 1995, at 10. For an analysis of Russian local instruments, see Paul Hofheinz,
In the Beginning Was the GKO, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Nov. 1995, at 19.
297. See Stan Hinden, While Latin American Stock Funds Sagged, Bonds Romped, Hous.
CHRON., Jan. 29, 1996, at 7.
298. Asian bonds were the least actively traded in the secondary market, whereas
Latin American bonds were the most actively traded. See World Bank Backs Asian Bond
Market-Second Best, INT'L FIN. REV., July 1, 1995.
299. Nicolas Rohatyn of JPMorgan is "personally . .. extremely driven by the no-
tion that.., to intermediate capital between the developing and developed markets...
is a fundamental good for the world." Saul Hansell, At Morgan, New Markets and a
Rohatyn Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1994 at DL. For the effect on an emerging market
such as Malaysia, see Jennifer Jacobs, Prospects for Public Listings Bright: Official, Bus.
TIMES (Malay.), Apr. 19, 1995, at 5. Whether these flows are a good is a separate ques-
tion beyond the scope of this work-on one view they support development in emerg-
ing nations, and on the other they permit excessive indebtedness and lead directly to
currency crises such as Mexico's in December 1994 and the East Asian economic trou-
bles of late.
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TABLE TWO: TURNOVER OF LOCAL INSTRUMENTFS300
Year Turnover Share of Market







Local instruments were a substantial market sector with a total
capitalization of some US$850 billion at year-end 1996302 and
US$599 billion at year-end 1999.313
As the crossover investors moved into the emerging mar-
kets, particularly the market in new issue bonds, and yields de-
clined, the traditional emerging markets capital sought out
higher returns in local markets. Stripped spreads on Brady
bonds fell from 1900 basis points in early 1995 to 800 basis
points in early 1996 and 400 basis points in early 1997.304 In-
deed, in one month alone in early 1997, spreads compressed by
well over 100 basis points. 30 5 This spread compression was
driven by the influx of crossover investors into this market and
the primary market. The compression squeezed many tradi-
tional investors out of the emerging markets and, in turn, these
traditional emerging markets investors supported a major expan-
sion in local instruments.
As would be expected, the highest returns were earned in
the most risky local markets such as Russia, Bulgaria, Romania,
300. EMTA, 1995 Annual Report (1995), http://www.emta.org/about/emta95ar
.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006); EMTA, 1997 Survey, supra note 172, Supplemental
Analysis, at 10.
301. EMTA's surveys almost certainly grossly underestimate the turnover of local
instruments as the surveys do not capture the turnover of many of the local traders in
the emerging market nations. For instance, trading in Brazil in Brazilian local
instruments is massive, and it is unlikely that these figures capture very much of this
trading at all. See Emerging Market Debt-A US$5tr. Market, INT'L FIN. REv., Mar. 22, 1997.
302. See Sara Kandler, Local Currency Markets Offer Promise and Risk, EMERGING MAR-
KETS DEBT REP., Feb. 3, 1997.
303. See EMTA, 2000 Annual Report, supra note 195.
304. See, e.g., Kandler, supra note 302.
305. Merrill Lynch, Emerging Markets Debt Monthly, Feb. 7, 1997, at 4.
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etc.3 ° 6 Russia, in particular, grew to rely upon short-term debt,
much to its detriment.30 7 GKOs, Russian sovereign short-term
paper, represented 9.2% of public debt in 1994 and a remarka-
ble 45.4% by 1996. By October 1997, outstanding GKOs totalled
US$55 billion with 30% held by foreigners. By December, the
proportion in foreign hands had declined to 18% due to the
general market sell-off and, more specifically, the withdrawal of
Brazilian and Korean investors.3 °
The major local currency index in this period was JP Mor-
gan's Emerging Local Markets Index, which tracked local-cur-
rency money market instruments in twenty-four countries.0 9 In
addition, in 1997, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell commenced its
Emerging Eastern Europe Index, which tracked performance of
local currency instruments in Eastern Europe.
An interesting variation in local markets was Mexico's crea-
tion in 1997 of a local market in its internationally issued debt,
both Brady bonds and eurobonds. Previously, a Mexican entity
wishing to invest in these instruments had to convert its savings
into U.S. dollars, deposit the money outside Mexico, and deal
with a secondary market trader. Since 1997, an entity can ac-
quire U.S. dollar-denominated Mexican sovereign bonds in Mex-
ico for pesos, earn the interest in U.S. dollars, be paid interest in
pesos, and liquidate the position in pesos.3 10 This new alterna-
tive provided much needed access for Mexican pension funds to
diversified and long-term investments. 1
5. New Brady Restructurings
The newly completed Brady-style restructurings in 1994 to
1995, namely Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria, the Domini-
306. See Rob Spence, Softly, Softly Catchee Yield, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, June
1997, at 32.
307. SeeJoanna Hickey & Paul Farrow, It's All Up to the IMF, INT'L FIN. REV., May 30,
1998.
308. See Paul Farrow, Rolling Out Domestic Debt Markets, IN'L FIN. REV., Feb. 14,
1998.
309. See Claude B. Erb et al., New Perspectives on Emerging Market Bonds, J. OF PORT-
FOLIO MGMT., Winter 1999, at 83; Nicholas Reynolds, Emerging Debt Markets Show Indepen-
dence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 1996, at 7.
310. See Baron Levin, Bolsa Boasts Brady Bonds, Bus. MEX., July 1, 1997; see, e.g.,
Mexico to Trade Bradys on Local Markets, EMERGING MARKETS DEBT REP., Apr. 21, 1997.
311. While technically such bonds are local instruments as they trade on a local
market, they are treated for our purposes as external debt.
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can Republic, Ecuador, Jordan, and Poland, each provided new
bonds which traded far more frequently than did the loans they
replaced and thus increased market activity."' These restructur-
ings, notably Brazil's, brought significant amounts of highly liq-
uid Brady bonds onto the secondary market and assisted in the
market's relatively quick recovery from the peso crisis and te-
quila effect.
F. Market Practices
This period saw a dramatic increase in sophistication of the
practices of the market, starting, it must be said, from a relatively
low base. The principal changes in market practices were the
increasing use of live screens and brokers to trade the debt, the
increasing importance of research, and four initiatives of the
Emerging Markets Traders Association ("EMTA"): (a) limits on
credit extended by traders to customers, (b) the multilateral net-
ting facility, (c) Match-EM, and (d) the Emerging Markets Clear-
ing Corporation. Each will be considered.
1. Screen Trading and the Role of Brokers
Live screens, quoting firm prices, expanded in this period
to include a wider range of debt and became the norm for major
assets in late 1993. They proved highly efficient at disseminating
Brady bond and Eurobond prices and "revolutionized Brady
broking."3 1 In doing so, they also changed the nature of trad-
ing. In 1994 and 1995, there was a distinct move towards screen-
312. Brazil completed its long-awaited restructuring in April 1994. It did so with-
out IMF approval, by securing a waiver of that term from the banks and acquiring the
required zero-coupon bonds from the market, rather than using zeroes specially issued
for the purpose by the U.S. treasury. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Foreign Debt Mop-Up; After
Refinancing Brazil, Banks Now Face Just a Few Small Bad International Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 1994, at DI; No IMF Letterfor Brazil, INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 19, 1994, at 49. In a
sense, this was quite different from all of the preceding Brady restructurings. Jordan
had completed its Brady-style restructuring in December 1993, Bulgaria in July 1994,
the Dominican Republic in August 1994, and Poland in October 1994. See World Bank,
1994-5 Debt Tables, supra note 291, at 4-5, 27-29, 68-75; see also Bulgaria-Brady Deal As-
sessed, INT'L FIN. REV., May 7, 1995; The Next Generation, INrr'L FIN. REV., Apr. 23, 1994.
Ecuador's restructuring was completed in 1995 with a 45% principal discount for dis-
count bonds, more favorable for the debtor than the 35% that had become the norm in
Latin America, but consistent with Poland's restructuring. See Richard Voorhees, Re-
joining the Fold, LATINFINANCE, June 1994, at 60.
313. Susan Hogg, Squeezed Until the Pips Squeak, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Apr.
1995, at 33, 35 [hereinafter Hogg, Pips Sqeak].
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based trading through a broker and away from traders dealing
directly with each other. As Jorge Jasson, of Chase Manhattan,
said at the end of 1995:
There's not as much dealer-to-dealer trading now ... direct
dealing is done mostly with clients ....
Our commitment to market-making and liquidity... is to our
clients and not to the Street. With more activity through bro-
kers, professionals now are not required to make markets to
each other. 14
This was a major change in the market's operation. The market
of the late 1980s and early 1990s functioned as an over-the-
counter market, in which liquidity was provided by market mak-
ers buying and selling for their own accounts. 15 While the mar-
ket remained, in essence, an over-the-counter market, the trend
was towards its functioning more like an exchange, in which li-
quidity arose from brokers matching buyers and sellers, and less
like an over-the-counter market.316
In early 1995, most traders were transacting about 50% to
60% of non-client business through brokers.1 7 The increased
use of brokers screens improved liquidity and price trans-
parency. For the first time, live screens permitted traders to see
the prices at which the market was clearing.318 This increased
use of brokers was promoted by the ease and efficiency of
screen-based trading, as well as the broking commission war that
had broken out.319
In early 1994, the standard commission was two basis points
charged to the party placing the buy or sell order (the so-called
"aggressor") and, shortly afterwards, one basis point to the ag-
gressor. 2 ° It appears this move towards fine commissions was an
attempt by the major brokers to squeeze out some of the newer
entrants in a market that was distinctly over-brokered. The in-
creased use of brokers was the only positive outcome of a corn-
314. Mary Tobin, Emerging Market Asset Trading House-Chase Manhattan\The Art of
Staying Focused, INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 16, 1995.
315. See Kilby, supra note 272, at 34.
316. See Ross P. Buckley, The Regulation of the Emerging Markets Loan Market, 30 LAw
& POL'Y INTr'L Bus. 47, 58-60 (1998).
317. See Hogg, Pips Sqeak, supra note 313, at 35.
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mission war that meant massive turnover was needed to earn
profits broking Brady bonds.3 2 1
Meanwhile, institutional investors with raised expectations
also came to prominence during this period, which increased
the level of sophistication in the market.
2. Increasing Importance of Research
As institutional investors came to dominate this market,
they demanded high quality research upon which to base their
investment decisions. 2 2 JPMorgan grew its research efforts in
1991; by 1995, it had thirty-five economists and analysts dedi-
cated to emerging markets research. 23 In addition to the usual
economic and political analysis, market strategy, and forecasts,
JPMorgan produced two indices: an Emerging Markets Bond In-
dex and a Brady Bond Index. These indices appeared on most
trading screens. The former, the Emerging Markets Bond Index,
became a key tool for benchmark-focused investors. 24 To put
JPMorgan's research commitment into context, Chase Manhat-
tan's research team, itself highly regarded, at the time comprised
sixteen people.325 Further evidence of the importance of quality
research is demonstrated by the poaching in 1995 by Merrill
Lynch of virtually the entire research team from Salomon Broth-
ers. 3 2 6 Headed by Joyce Chang, the compact, but highly re-
garded, team of approximately fourteen people gave Merrill an
immediate profile in research.
The production of emerging markets research and indices
served the market well. 327 The importance of a transparent mar-
ket operating on high quality information is reflected in the de-
cision of the International Finance Corporation to produce two
321. See Hogg, Pips Sqeak, supra note 313, at 35. In early 1995, there were seven
brokers in New York and five in London, in a market in which most brokers thought
four in New York and two in London would be a happy number. Id. New York ac-
counted for about 80% of emerging markets debt broking because of the predomi-
nance of Brady bonds and eurobonds. Id.
322. See Mary Tobin, Latin American Debt Research House-Maintaining Its Pre-emi-
nence, INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 16, 1995; see also Keith Mullin, Emerging Markets Research




326. See Keith Mullin, Latin American Debt Research House-Merrill Lynch-New Kid
on the Block, INT'L FIN. REv., Dec. 21, 1996.
327. See id.
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indices of emerging markets equities:
Nonetheless, relative to older markets, the market still oper-
ated on relatively poor information. This was reflected in the
large number of traders who came from Latin American coun-
tries: in the absence of plentiful formal information, access to
informal informational sources and a deep knowledge of a coun-
try was relatively more important.
3. Limits on Extension of Credit
In 1994, EMTA acknowledged that excessive leverage had
contributed to the size and speed of the collapse of early 1994.
EMTA recommended that the initial extension of credit by mar-
ket participants to their customers be limited to between 50%
and 75% for loans, 60% and 80% for Brady and other bonds,
and 65% and 85% for short-term debt instruments.329 EMTA's
guidelines and recommendations, which are still in force today,
are not law and not directly enforceable. The experience of the
market, though, suggests that the rate of compliance with the
guidelines is high, as sophisticated participants recognize their
own interests in a well-organized market.3
4. Multilateral Netting Facility
In September 1994, EMTA implemented its Multilateral
Netting Facility so that only netted trades33 1 would need to be
reported to agent banks.3 32 The netting facility reduced the ad-
ministrative burden on back offices of both traders and agent
banks. Specifically, the facility proved its worth on the restruc-
turing of Russia's debt in which it settled over US$7.3 billion of
when-issued, when-restructured and participation trades by 161
market participants in three weeks. Previously, these settlements
328. See IIF Changes Focus-Not Stable Enough, INr'L FIN. REv., Apr. 30, 1994.
329. See EMTA, Bulletin, 3rd Quarter 1994, at 2-3, http://www.emta.org/bulletin/3
qtr94.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
330. See id.; Michael Chamberlin, EMTA Offers Multilateral Netting Facility, INr'L FIN.
L. REv., 1996, at 41.
331. See Chamberlin, supra note 330, at 41.
332. See id. The netting facility was developed in response to the large backlog of
unsettled trades that developed from the continued high volume of loan trading. See
EMTA, supra note 329, at 2. By early November 1995, the facility had settled 1,837
trades of Russian loans with a face value of about $4.6 billion, some $125 million face
value of Panamanian loans and $55 million of Peruvian loans. See EMTA, 1994 Annual
Report 9 (1994), http://www.emta.org/about/emta94ar.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
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would have required many months to effect.333
5. Match-EM
Match-EM is an automated trade confirmation and match-
ing system for Brady bonds and loans, which allows traders to
confirm trades almost instantaneously, thereby greatly reducing
the risk of errors and other problems. It was launched on May 1,
1995; within four months of commencement, approximately
one-half of the market and the majority of brokers were wired
into it.3 3 4 After one year of operation, there was a daily average
of 1,200 trade inputs being entered into the system with an aver-
age matching rate of 92%. 335 Match-EM allowed EMTA to begin
to collect and disseminate more accurate volume and price in-
formation on a daily basis 633 ' effecting a substantial reduction in
settlement risk. It also enabled participants to manage their in-
ventories more effectively and enhanced the efficiency and
transparency of the market.337
6. Emerging Markets Clearing Corporation
In early 1995, the EMTA began developing proposals for a
clearing corporation that would "accept matched trades of
emerging markets debt . . .net aggregate trade positions and
issue net delivery and payment instructions to Euroclear and
Cedel. '' 3 ' The Emerging Markets Clearing Corporation
("EMCC") was established in conjunction with, and is operated
by, the International Securities Clearing Corporation. 39
The EMCC was primarily established to promote the effi-
ciency and the orderly development of the market and to end
the over-concentration of counterparty risk in two sets of institu-
tions: the commercial clearers of emerging debt (a field domi-
333. See EMTA, 1997 Annual Report 2, 5 (1997), http://www.emta.org/about/emta
97ar.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
334. See EMTA-Moving Ahead, INT'L FIN. REV., Dec. 16, 1995.
335. See EMTA, 1995 Annual Report, supra note 300, at 13; Michael Chamberlin,
EMTA Offers Electronic Matching for Brady Bonds and Loans, INT'L FIN. L. REv., 1996, at 48,
50.
336. See EMTA, Bulletin, 1st Quarter 1995, at 6, http://www.emta.org/bulletin/1
qtr95.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
337. See EMTA, 1994 Annual Report, supra note 332, at 9.
338. Chamberlin, supra note 335, at 50.
339. See Chris Kentouris, Global Goals Drive DTC-NSCC Merger, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS,
Mar. 29, 1999, at 1.
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nated by Daiwa Securities America), and the brokers. Rapid
rises in market turnover led to increases in the number of
Daiwa's counterparties, exposing the firm to ever higher levels of
counterparty risk. Likewise, higher turnover exposes brokers to
a greater risk of having, unintentionally, to maintain positions
overnight or longer, which is problematic as brokers are typically
thinly capitalized. As all trades between members are guarantee
and the EMCC is fully collateralized by all members,
counterparty risk is massively reduced. 4 ° In the hopes of creat-
ing a more efficient market, JPMorgan was the impetus and
guiding hand behind the formation of the Euro-area Economy
Modelling Centre ("EMCC"), motivated by its interest as a major
emerging markets trading house in addition to being the owner
of Euroclear.34'
The dramatic increase in Brady bond turnover that accom-
panied the October 1997 market turmoil demonstrated in stark
terms the need for such a clearing corporation. The ordinary
turnover of about 750 Brady trades per day increased to 4,500
per day; concurrently, the number and rate of mismatches grew
dramatically. The EMCC could have provided real-time match-
ing of trades and settlement instructions for both parties to
Euroclear or CEDEL-thus avoiding the bottlenecks that devel-
oped in late October when mismatched settlement instructions
became unacceptably common. 42 Unfortunately, as the market
turmoil unfolded, the final proposal for the EMCC was at the
Securities and Exchange Commission awaiting approval (which
was not granted until February 1998). The EMCC commenced
commercial operation in April 1998. 4
There are costs to EMCC membership, as high-quality col-
lateral has to be posted with the clearing corporation. Accord-
ingly, many of the smaller banks and brokers did not join.
G. Participants
1. Traders
JP Morgan was the leading trader throughout this period.
340. See Enterprising EMTA, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Sept. 1996, at 7.
341. For an excellent analysis ofJPMorgan as the driving force behind the EMCC,
see Jack Willoughby, Emerging Risk, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1997, at 39.
342. See id.
343. The EMCC cost about $3.5 million to establish.
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Its turnover was US$1,052 million face value of debt in 1997, our
sample year. Other prominent traders and their turnover in mil-
lions of U.S. dollars in 1997 are: Chase Manhattan ($810),
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell ("DMG") ($790), Lehman Brothers
($600), ING Barings ($373), Bear Stearns ($335), Salomon
Smith Barney ($257), and Bank of Boston ($259). 44  The
figures appear somewhat inflated relative to other sources, as
one would expect-they are self-reported. Nonetheless, the rela-
tive rankings of trading houses are probably sufficiently accu-
rate.
DMG's strong performance in 1997 is doubtless attributable
to its bold hiring of over seventy of ING Barings sales, trading
and research staff in mid-1996.3 45 The dramatic move was at
least in step with historical precedent: DMG acquired its entire
original Emerging Markets division of fifty staff in one swoop in
1990 when Libra Bank closed its doors. Major moves are not
uncommon in this market. In March 1995, Bankers Trust's
twenty-five person emerging markets trading team moved to
Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette, a complete newcomer to the busi-
ness.3 46 In February 1998, ING Barings stopped all dedicated eq-
uities research, sales, and trading for Latin America and laid off
about 200 employees 347-somewhat remarkable given that the
bank had been voted the best overall emerging markets bank,
ahead ofJPMorgan and Merrill Lynch, in surveys of some 1,500
money managers in 1997 and 1996, and their research team had
been voted the best in the emerging markets only three months
previously. 48 While it had a good debt trading operation, ING
Barings had apparently been unable to establish a significant
presence in the more lucrative corporate finance and equity un-
derwriting sectors.3 4 9
344. These figures are from surveys by the Emerging Markets Investor. See Melvyn
Westlake, Scrambling for the Top, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Mar. 1998, at 17; West-
lake, Storming Morgan, supra note 186, at 21.
345. See Melvyn Westlake, DMG Goes for Broke, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Aug.
1996, at 16.
346. See Ernest McCrary, Rendezvous on Park Avenue, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,
June 1996, at 46.
347. See ING Barings Axes 200, INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 14, 1998, at 4.
348. See Investors' Number One: ING Barings Romps Home Again, EMERGING MARKETS
INVESTOR, Sept. 1997, at 28; Local Knowledge Is Power, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Dec.
1997, at LB3.
349. See Weever & Newton, supra note 347, at 4.
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By 1995, emerging markets divisions had become important
parts of their respective banks. Citicorp's experiences make this
particularly clear. Between 1990 and 1994, Citicorp laid off or
lost as a result of business sales some 19,000 staff, but in the same
period added 6,000 new jobs in emerging markets.15' By the
end of 1994, 45% of Citicorp's total profits came from its emerg-
ing markets operations, and the share was growing. This figure
comprised the bank's entire emerging markets operation, in-
cluding corporate loans, bond and equity underwriting, equity
trading, etc., in addition to the secondary market in debt. How-
ever, 45% of profits coming from emerging markets is nonethe-
less remarkable when one considers that, at the time, Citicorp
was the largest bank in the U.S. and the largest issuer of credit
cards in the world. 5'
Some indication of the number of traders in this market is
given by membership in the Emerging Markets Traders Associa-
tion. As of May 1, 1998 EMTA had 125 members that traded
debt: Sixty-five Full Members, defined as "institutions which ac-
tively trade Emerging Markets instruments," a further fifty-four
Associate Members, defined as "institutions that trade Emerging
Markets instruments but are smaller and less active than Full
Members," and six Local Market Members, that trade in local
instruments. 352
The wave of crossover investors began to alter the way the
trading houses structured themselves. In mid-1997, Citibank
merged its capital markets efforts in high-yield and emerging
markets, while retaining separate sales desks, while Morgan Stan-
ley merged its high-yield and emerging markets groups.353
The market turmoil in late 1997 and 1998 saw major staff
reductions among the major banks and other trading houses in
the final quarter of 1998. It was as if the major players were wait-
ing to see if business would rebound after the Asian crisis. Once
the Russian debacle occurred, they were convinced the business
would not rebound any time soon. The result was a slew of lay-
offs from banks' emerging markets operations. 54
350. See Simon Hylson-Smith, Bank of the Year-Citicorp, INT'L FIN. REV., Dec 17,
1994.
351. See id.
352. EMTA, 1997 Annual Report, supra note 333, at 16.
353. See High-yield Future-Loans, INT'L FIN. REV., June 14, 1997.
354. See Richard Miles, Merrill Lynch to Shed 3,400 Staff TIMES (UK), Oct. 14, 1998,
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2. Sellers
Early in this period, the major net sellers of debt were the
money-center banks, particularly the Japanese and, to a lesser
extent, the U.S. banks.3 55 Their sales were facilitated, at least in
the U.S., by loan-loss provisions that, by then, were generous.
The major banks had deep pockets which remained filled with
Brady bonds356-in late 1994 Canadian and Italian banks had
apparently not even begun to sell their Brady bonds. Overall,
the banks remained the largest holders of Brady bonds. 57 In-
deed, these deep pockets posed problems for the market, as
more debt would come on to the market each time prices moved
up, making a recovery difficult to sustain.358
Later in the period, debt was supplied to the market by the
full range of its holders. Banks and investors from across the
globe were now participating as sellers. The Asian and Russian
crises, as one would expect, caused a wave of selling. Many
open-ended mutual funds were forced to liquidate assets at virtu-
ally any price to meet investor redemptions. In addition, as the
regional economies went into a tailspin, many local investors
were forced to sell assets to stay solvent.
3. Buyers
In this period, the investment vehicle of choice for retail
investors were funds, of which a full range was available: emerg-
ing markets mutual funds (both open-ended and closed-ended
funds), emerging markets infrastructure funds, emerging mar-
kets bond funds, emerging markets equity funds (some of which
also purchased Brady bonds because of their equity-like charac-
teristics); and the whole range of non-dedicated mutual funds
that often invested a small portion of their capital into the
at 23; Onelia Collazo, Of Dismissals and Resignations, LATINFINANCE, Dec. 1998, at 10;
Ellen Leander, Next the Big Shake-Out, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Oct. 1998, at 11
(noting that in September, Bankers Trust dismissed thirty-four employees in Mexico
and an additional twenty from its emerging markets trading desk in New York, while
Credit Suisse First Boston dismissed forty-five from its emerging markets trading and
derivatives desks in November).
355. See Kilby, supra note 272, at 34; see also Norman Peagram, How Safe Are Those
Bradys, EUROMONEY, Sept 1994, at 50.
356. See Kilby, supra note 272, at 34.
357. See Peagram, supra note 355, at 50.
358. See Westlake, Little Time, supra note 60, at 14.
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emerging markets in search of a higher average yield.359 Brady
bonds were available from some brokers, but generally in mini-
mum denominations of US$250,000; mutual funds were the pre-
ferred method of spreading the risk. 6 ° In addition, high-yield
('junk") bond funds often invested sizeable proportions of their
portfolios, at times up to 25%, into emerging markets debt.3 6 '
There was a boom in funds in the first half of 1994 with over
US$8 billion raised by 211 funds.36 2 Given the problems in the
market, this was somewhat surprising, but it seems investors were
hoping to recapture the 70% return most funds showed in
1993.363 However, the peso devaluation and tequila effect in
early 1995, reined in this growth dramatically and only US$1.33
billion was raised by seventy-four funds in the first half of
1995.364 Bond funds enjoyed a good year in 1995, gaining on
average 20.1% on the back of the high interest rates emerging
markets issuers were forced to offer. On the other hand, equity
funds, which far outnumbered bond funds, lost on average 4.6%
for the year, while Latin American equity funds were down on
average 20.6%.365 Nonetheless, mutual funds, in general, be-
came so influential in this period that commentators were writ-
ing of "a new phenomenon in Latin America where mutual fund
managers, not bankers, can bring an economy to its knees. 36 6
Indeed, by the end of this period, Charles Dallara, the managing
359. See Westlake, Shaken, supra note 175, at 13; Melvyn Westlake, Turning up the
heat, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Mar. 1996, at 10. For examples of new funds being
launched, see Adam Courtenay, Opportunity Knocks as Peru Rings Changes, SUNDAY TIMES
(LONDON),June 18, 1995, § 6, at 6; Discreet Charm of Debt, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR,
Dec. 1995, at 6; Clifford German, Gambling on Third World Debt, INDEP., Nov. 18, 1995, at
26; Duncan Hughes, Bond Fund Targets Emerging Markets, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
29, 1995, at 12.
360. See Riva Atlas, The Brady Bunch, FORBES, June 19, 1995, at 194.
361. See Abby Schultz, Mutual Funds Report; Yes, Those Junk-Bond Funds Are Still
Cheap, But Go on Tiptoes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, § 3, at 51.
362. See Susan Hogg, Running Uphill, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Sept. 1995, at
37 [hereinafter Hogg, Running Uphill].
363. SeeJohn Waggoner, Peso Pummels Emerging Markets Funds, USA TODAY, Jan. 3,
1995, at 3B.
364. See Hogg, Running Uphill, supra note 362, at 37.
365. See Hinden, supra note 297, at 7.
366. Kevin G. Hall, Latin America Economies Vulnerable to Uninformed Investing Deci-
sions, J. COMM., Apr. 28, 1995, at 3A. As an example of the size and diversity of these
funds, consider the two Sociht6 Ghnhrale managed funds launched in late 1993 and
early 1994 with initial asset values of 1 billion and 2.2 billion French francs, respectively.
See French Bank Leverages Emerging Market Fund-Fed Stance May Jeopardise Rolling Spot,
INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 19, 1994.
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director of the Institute of International Finance was quoted as
saying: "[T] he debt flows to the emerging markets are going to
come from . .. pension funds and mutual funds .... not from
bank balance sheets."36 Funds had assumed a central role in
international capital flows.
An open-ended fund (known as a unit trust in England) is
obliged to redeem shares (or units) if requested by shareholders
at the net asset value per share.368  This posed enormous
problems for fund managers in early 1995. The peso crisis led to
a rush of redemption requests to funds that were invested in es-
sentially illiquid underlying assets. The resultant shakeout
among open-ended funds suggested that closed-ended funds
(known as investment trusts in England, in which investors can
sell their shares on the market but not demand their redemp-
tion by the fund) were a more suitable vehicle for investing in
the highly volatile emerging markets.369 Nonetheless, because
capital for the emerging markets was scarce in the first half of
1995, open-ended funds accounted for two-thirds of funds
launched, as they allowed the fund manager to start with a
smaller fund and create new shares over time if demand im-
proved.37 °
The other big buyers were the other institutional investors:
hedge funds, insurance companies, and pension funds. 71 The
term, "hedge fund" is, simply, "a broad catch-all for an incentive-
based partnership. '372 Indeed, the term "hedge" in the title is an
historical misnomer. 373 Today hedge funds are more likely to be
using leverage, short positions, and derivatives in search of
greater profits, than to be cautiously hedging their risks.174 The
367. Mitchell Martin, Wall Street Sees Red at U.S. Plan for Bondholders to Accept More
Risk, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 26, 1999, at 16.
368. See Susan Hogg, No Redeeming Features, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, May
1995, at 36.
369. See id.; see also Mike Goodman, Investment Trusts Survey: Emerging Again as a
Favorite, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 6, 1996, at 16.
370. This was a neat reversal of the trend in 1994 when closed-end funds ac-
counted for 64% of the total. See Hogg, Running Uphill, supra note 362, at 37.
371. See Capital R~ows to Developing Countries Shrink Slightly, Bus. TIMES (Malay.), Dec.
26, 1995, at 5.
372. Kerry Fraser, Doing Their Own Thing, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Aug. 1995,
at 11 (quoting Ted Caldwell).
373. See Claire Makin, Doesn't Anybody Remember Risk?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Apr. 1995, at 41.
374. See Fraser, supra note 372, at 11.
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quest for high yields drew hedge funds almost inevitably to the
emerging markets.3 75
The sea change in the approach of institutional investors
towards risk continued in this period, especially for mutual
funds. In the words of a contemporaneous report:
Strategies once deemed to be on the wilder, forbidden shores
of the business are being eagerly embraced by mainline insti-
tutional investors. The justification? Investing across markets
that are out of step with one another enhances returns while
reducing risk.376
Mutual and hedge funds were major investors in Brady bonds in
this period. As we have seen, the supposed low correlation be-
tween countries in a region and between regions, if true for eq-
uities, had never been true for Brady bonds. Nonetheless, funds
had to hand a neat justification to invest in a range of Brady
bonds-and returns from Bradys were high enough to make a
fund manager's performance sparkle. The other attraction of
Bradys was their denomination in U.S. dollars, which, as fund
managers repeatedly said, meant no currency risk.377 However,
denominating the bulk of a nation's borrowings in U.S. dollars
merely transferred the currency risk to the borrower, making re-
payment difficult and restructuring more likely. Essentially, the
risk remained with the investor. 7
One of the principal changes to the market in this period
was that the universe of investors broadened tremendously, at
least until the Asian economic crisis of mid-to-late 1997.
Throughout 1996 and the first half of 1997, the market enjoyed
the support of the investors with long-term investment hori-
zons-such as multi-national corporations, pension funds, insur-
ance companies and mutual funds (collectively, the so-called
"crossover investors")-that it had craved for so long.379 These
were principally U.S. investors, as European institutions had not
375. See id.
376. Makin, supra note 373, at 41.
377. See Sandeep Dahiya, The Risks and Returns of Brady Bonds in a Portfolio Frame-
work, FIN. MARKETS, INST., & INSTRUMENTS, at 45 (1997).
378. See Peter Dirou & Ross Buckley, Strengthening the International Financial System
(forthcoming).
379. See I World Bank, Development Finance 1997, supra note 66, at 4; see also Brady
Bonds-Too Good to Last, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, Jan. 1997, at 17; Keith Mullin,
Brady Bond Review-Major Strides Forward, INT'L FIN. REV., Dec. 21, 1996.
2007]
252 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:185
yet developed the appetite for risk of their U.S. counterparts. 310
These funds had access to tremendous amounts of capital.
As the World Bank noted in late 1997, "[t] he last few years have
witnessed an increasing concentration of national savings in the
hands of institutional investors ... 8. 13 Returns on emerging
markets debt ensured that, although small, the proportion of
this money finding its way into emerging markets debt was in-
creasing. JP Morgan's Index, a total return index, put total re-
turns for 1996 at 39% across the sector, with Argentina returning
35%, Brazil 55%, Mexico 35%, Panama a staggering 85% and
Venezuela 62%.382 The average return for 1996 was 42% com-
pared to 13.5% for high-yield 'junk" bond funds and 4.7% for
high-grade U.S. bonds.3 8 Emerging market equity funds were
another story, with many leading funds returning substantial
losses for the year. Such stellar returns on debt, merely one year
after the tequila effect, establish that a year is a long time in the
emerging markets.
The other major category of buyer in this period was hedge
funds. As private entities, hedge funds are not subject to report-
ing requirements, leading to potentially imperfect statistics:
while the World Bank states there were fifty-seven dedicated
emerging markets funds in 1997 with some US$7.1 billion of as-
sets, 38 4 the London-based fund monitor, Tass Management, be-
lieves there were eighty-five funds with some US$12 billion in
assets, and other estimates are of 130 funds controlling some
US$15 billion.185 Likewise, general funds were estimated to con-
trol anywhere from US$145 to US$300 billion of assets. 3 6
After October 1997, the wider spreads brought back the
380. See, e.g., Keith Mullin, TMCC Prepares Entree into Europe, INT'L FIN. REV., Apr.
25, 1998 [hereinafter Mullin, Entree].
381. Alex Crossman, What Happens Next? Swiss Virtual Bank Calls, INT'L FIN. REV.,
Dec. 20, 1997.
382. See Emerging Markets: Stellar Year for LatAm Bonds-Czech Koruna, INT'L FIN.
REv., Jan. 25, 1997.
383. See Russ Wiles, Income Investor: Something for the Adventurous, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1997, at D8.
384. See 1 World Bank, Development Finance 1998, supra note 82, at 17.
385. See Rob Spence, Who's Afraid of the Big, Bad Hedge Funds?, 4 EMERGING MARKETS
INVESTOR, Oct. 1997, at 17.
386. See id.; see also 1 World Bank, Development Finance 1998, supra note 82, at 17
(citing Tass Management as source of estimates). Hedge funds attracted considerable
criticism for precipitating the Asian Economic Crisis, but this is an oversimplification.
Hedge funds are an easy target to blame for a crisis caused more by excessive capital
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traditional emerging markets investors to the mainstream Latin
American and East Asian assets.3 8 7 The very fine pre-October
spreads had seen much traditional emerging markets capital
move on, often into local currency denominated instruments, 8
in search of higher yields-yields that were, again, to be found
in their traditional hunting ground. The principal buyers after
the Asian crisis were the traditional emerging markets investors,
who understood the risks (which includes buyers from the
emerging markets nations themselves) as well as U.S. high-yield
funds investing in specific industry sectors.3 89
4. Brokers
Screens have offered the market a number of advantages
including facilitating swifter and more accurate trading and the
anonymous conduct of large-scale business. 39 0 Before screens,
major trades often moved the market as it speculated on why
that bank would make that trade. For instance, if a bank known
to act regularly for a certain country made a large acquisition,
other traders might take positions on the assumption that the
bank was repurchasing some of the country's debt on its be-
half.391
Screens have significantly improved liquidity and trans-
parency in the market and, of course, entrenched the role of
brokers. In 1993, perhaps one-fourth of non-client business was
put through brokers; by 1996, the proportion had risen to three-
fourths.392
Screens were pioneered by Reuters, which posted prices and
names of participants on information from Martin Quintin-
Archard's Intercapital. In 1993, Chapdelaine Securities intro-
duced its own no-name-give-up screens to strong resistance from
many traders who wanted name-disclosed broking to continue so
they could know who was doing what. The major brokerages
flows from developed countries, inadequate local prudential supervision, and over-
valued exchange rates than by the actions of these speculators.
387. See Mullin, Entree, supra note 380.
388. See Paul Farrow, Emerging Market Debt-That's All Folks, INT'L FIN. REV., Nov. 1,
1997.
389. See Westlake, Junkyard, supra note 287, at 15, 17.
390. See Rob Spence, Live and Ticking, EMERGING MARKETS INVESTOR, May 1996, at
16.
391. See id.
392. See id. at 17.
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such as Cantor Fitzgerald, EuroBrokers, Tradition and Tullett &
Tokyo soon followed suit. Initially, these proprietary screens
were only made available to market-makers who would stand by
their prices, and many boutique investment houses and second-
and third-tier banks, which had used Reuters public screens,
were denied access. However, by 1996, access had broadened to
the point that many criticized the service was too widely availa-
ble. There were allegations that screens were being supplied to
both institutional investors and local players in emerging mar-
kets nations.19 3
Brokers and their screens came to dominate the trading of
Brady bonds. By 1998, estimates showed that up to 90% of Brady
trading in the interdealer market was conducted through bro-
kers' screens. 3 4  Nonetheless, the market remained over-
brokered, with perhaps twice the necessary number of broker-
ages scrambling for the business.395 The reason for the over-
broking was simple: Even at one basis point, the potential
commissions were huge.
5. Clearing Systems
The final significant participant in the market was the inter-
national securities clearing systems. The two principal interna-
tional clearing systems were, and continue to be, Euroclear and
CEDEL. Formed in 1968 and 1970, these two clearing systems
and securities depositories serve as the traditional means by
which to distribute, hold, clear, and settle Eurobonds. Mexico's
Aztec bonds, issued in 1988, were the first Latin American securi-
ties to be held in quantity in the clearing systems. Mexico's
Brady bonds were distributed, held and settled through the
clearing systems but not without difficulty. The two principal
difficulties were: (i) the entire issue was printed in US$1,000
denominations, and (ii) there were value-recovery rights at-
tached to the bonds which were designed so that repayments in-
creased when oil prices reached certain specified levels. These
rights had to be detached from the bonds according to a pre-
determined program. Once detached, settlement involved deliv-
393. See id. at 18.
394. See Jack Willoughby, Emerging Risk, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR INT'L ED., Dec.
1997, at 43.
395. See Spence, supra note 390, at 19.
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ery of both the bond and the rights. The lessons were duly
learned from these clearing and settlement difficulties: the en-
tire bond issue in the subsequent Brady-style restructurings was
represented by one global certificate and the concept of value-
recovery-rights was dropped.396
The clearing systems have proceeded to handle the distribu-
tion, settlement and subsequent trading of each of the Brady
bond and new bond issuances together with an ever-increasing
array of local instruments.
397
Presently, settlement in the clearing systems is by book-en-
tries. If there is a physical certificate for the underlying security,
it is held, immobile, at a clearing system depositary. Settlement
can be in any of over thirty currencies, irrespective of the de-
nominated currency of the security, and "delivery" and payment
are simultaneous. These two features reduce the risks inherent
in the physical movement of security instruments and in delays
between delivery and payment. By 1995, the standard settlement
period for bonds had been reduced from seven days after trade
(T+7) to three days after trade (T+3). The efficiency of these
standard procedures increased market liquidity and attracted
some foreign investors, particularly to local instruments, which
would otherwise have been chary of domestic settlement risk. 98
H. Impact of the Market
The market had three principal effects in this period. It fa-
cilitated: (i) the growth in local currency denominated instru-
ments; (ii) the growth in formal Brady bond exchanges and
other debt buy-backs; and (iii) it exerted considerable pressure
on emerging markets' governments to implement the "Washing-
ton consensus" on economic policy. 399 Each will be considered.
1. Growth in Local Currency Instruments
The issuance and secondary market turnover of local cur-
rency denominated instruments expanded dramatically in this




399. See At the Crossroads, INT'L FIN. REV., Mar. 6, 1999 (defining term "Washington
consensus").
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of Brady and new issue bonds by the willingness of crossover in-
vestors to accept low returns on Brady and new issue bonds. By
introducing many investors to the asset class, the secondary mar-
ket facilitated the growth in new issues as well as secondary trad-
ing. Of course, with hindsight, whether the typically short tenor
of most local currency instruments served the debtors is highly
questionable.
2. Growth in Brady Bond Exchanges and Other
Debt Buy-Backs
Debtors repurchased substantial amounts of their Brady
bonds during this period because the secondary market price
represented a particularly good deal for them. During this pe-
riod, formal Brady bond exchanges resulted in the replacement
of over US$13 billion of Brady bonds with some US$10.6 billion
of newly issued bonds. The substantial amount of collateral lib-
erated in this process was used principally to retire relatively ex-
pensive short-term debt. These Brady exchanges allowed the
debtor countries to establish yield curves out to thirty years gen-
erally considered to have been in the debtor's interests. Most of
the participants in these exchanges were institutional investors
that sought the higher yields available on pure emerging mar-
kets risk-few banks exchanged their bonds. As the market had
facilitated the transfer of ownership of Brady bonds from the
original bank holders to the institutional investors, the market
indirectly facilitated these Brady exchanges.
If formal Brady bond exchanges served the debtor nations,
informal buy-backs certainly did. Informal exchanges, being pri-
vate and confidential, did not drive up the secondary market
prices of a nation's bonds as did the announcement of a formal
Brady bond exchange. Accordingly, the debtor nation was able
to recapture the entire secondary market discount for its benefit.
Informal buy-backs were the principal source of debt relief for
Latin American sovereigns and East Asian corporations during
this period.
3. Increase in Economic "Discipline"
The international movement of private capital has exerted
considerable economic "discipline" on emerging market na-
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tions.4 °° Institutional investors almost invariably subscribe to the
"Washington consensus" on economic policy, which prescribes
budget surpluses or small deficits, relatively high interest rates to
maintain the value of the local currency, minimal government
price regulation, reform and liberalization of local financial sys-
tems, and privatisation of state-owned assets. If one believes that
this is a recipe for economic health in emerging market coun-
tries, then the market serves a salutary purpose: Emerging mar-
ket governments can only depart from the formula at the cost of
severe penalties as the institutional investors withdraw their
funds. In turn, the cost of raising capital increases as accessibil-
ity to capital decreases.4 °1 Similarly, if one believes that this is a
recipe for economic dislocation and impoverishment of the al-
ready poor, the market's impact has hardly been positive.
CONCLUSION
In January 1994, the bulls of 1993 looked like they would
run all the way from Mexico to Pamplona. In February, they
stopped at Wall Street, causing frightened institutional investors
to return their capital to developed countries. By September
and October of 1994, mutual funds and others were returning to
the emerging markets and the optimists were again getting most
of the media coverage.40 2 In December, the Mexican peso was
allowed to float, and sank. The effect on the other emerging
markets was like a quart of tequila-the hangover was horren-
dous. According to some, the hangover never fully lifted-in
early 1997 average spreads on Brady bonds (the margin between
their yield and that of U.S. Treasury bonds) were around 480
basis points compared to 300 basis points in 1993.403 This re-
400. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Risk Management in the
Global Financial System, Remarks Before the Annual Financial Markets Conference of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Feb. 27, 1998), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boardDocs/speeches/1998/19980227.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2006) ("With the new
more sophisticated financial markets punishing errant government policy behavior far
more profoundly than in the past, vicious cycles are evidently emerging more often.");
see also Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-Border Lending: What's Different This Time?, 16 Nw.J. INr'L
L. & Bus. 44, 54-55 (1995); 1 World Bank, Development Finance 1997, supra note 66, at 4.
401. See At the Crossroads, supra note 399.
402. See Francis Flaherty, Bullish Bond Funds Mine Emerging Nations, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1994, at 31.
403. See Lee Yoke Har, Brady Bonds: Stronger Now, Bus. TIMES (Sing.), Mar. 15,
1997, at 4.
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flected a change in the investor base. The typical investors in
1991 and 1993 were short-term speculators motivated by capital
gains,4 °4 so called "momentum" investors,40 5 of whom many were
driven from the market by the collapses that began and ended
1994. Yields then had to rise to attract investors who wanted to
lend to these countries in the longer term.4 °6 In the words of
EMTA's 1996 Volume Survey: "To many, 1996 marked a year
when the emerging markets took large strides toward becoming
a mature marketplace; and Emerging Markets debt instruments
became a legitimate, distinct asset class and an important part of
the investment mainstream. 40 7
However, the flaw in 1996 was that investors were happy
with returns that did not reflect the real risks inherent in emerg-
ing markets debt. As U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin iden-
tified in 1999, "excessive capital flows . . . can be indicative of
broader failures in transparency and risk management ... there
is . . . a need to address the weaknesses in risk assessment that
contributed to the recent crisis."4 8 Certainly, in 1996 investors
in this market were making major errors in risk assessment-
errors that increased the flow of funds to Asia and thus com-
pounded the eventual problems there.
One clear lesson from this research is that while contempo-
rary risk management models may work well when their assump-
tions apply, a liquid market is one critical assumption for these
models. The secondary market did not provide the required
levels of liquidity in times of crisis in the second half of the
1990s. Models developed for the major capital markets of the
world cannot simply be applied to the secondary market for
emerging markets debt as if it is a smaller version of the New
York Stock Exchange, no matter how much traders might crave
the spurious certainty and security such models offer.
Nonetheless, the emerging markets in this period grew to
become an inextricable element of the global financial markets,
as the Russian crisis of 1998 firmly established. The global shift
404. See Muehring, supra note 62, at 127.
405. See Evans, supra note 211, at 45-46.
406. See Submerging Bond Markets, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 1995, at 78.
407. EMTA, 1996 Survey, supra note 171, Supplemental Analysis, at 1.
408. Robert E. Rubin, Treasury Sec'y, Remarks on Reform of the International
Financial Architecture to the School of Advance International Studies (Apr. 21, 1999),
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of investment capital into institutional investors has put a pre-
mium on high yields. The competition between fund managers
to attract the most capital to their fund, retain their jobs, and
improve their annual remuneration ensures that the search for
yield will continue to characterize much capital markets behav-
ior. Insofar as yield is pre-eminent, the emerging markets will
remain a significant and integral part of the global financial mar-
kets.
